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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with the question of 
emotions: whether emotions are of interest, or 
concern to the educator; whether they require 
specific educational attemtion; what, if anything, 
our educational aims with regards~emotions, are; 
whether emotions pose any special problems for the 
educator; and so on. 
The first chapter looks at the nature of 
emotions, and attempts to draw some sort of conceptual 
map of the class of things we call 'emotions'. 
the second chapter discusses the ways in which 
we can he more, and less, rational about our emotions, 
and a number of specific educational aims are 
outlined. 
The third chapter argues that educators in-
fluence childeen's emotions. This influence cannot be 
undone simply by an adherence to rationality, and 
leaves the educator facing some difficult questions 
about the direction and nature of that influence. 
To a degree he can answer this with reference to 
mental health, human happiness, and a necessary 
minimal social morality. But though this may yrovide 
him with general guidelines, it will not justify the 
specific influence he has on children's emotions. 
The fourth chapter attempts to provide some 
answers to this problem. The argument is that just 
as comprehensive knowledge and rational thinking 
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protects us from being indoctrinated with regardsto 
our beliefs, so comprehensive knowledge and 
understanding of the emotions and values of other 
people (something gained through the ability to 
empathize) protects us from being indoctrinated with 
regardsmour emotions. 
The final chapter looks briefly at the skills 
needed to understand our own emotions, and to empathize 
with other people: the ability to express and 
communicate our feelings effectively. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EMOTIONS 
The question I shall attempt to answer in 
this chapter is 'What is an emotion~. 
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The word , that seems to be most closely associ-
ated with emotions is 'feeling'. We feel frightened, 
angry, elated or proud and these are but a few examples. 
Do all emotions involve feelings? We can speak of 
hating a job, or admiring a person, without feelin~ 
anything at that particular moment. But we cannot make 
such claims if we have never felt much about the job, 
or person. And how can I be annoyed right now, and not 
feel anything? The distinction to be drawn here is 
between the temporary states of emotion we experience 
and the generalizations we make about such states. By 
calling someone happy, or jealous or irritable we may 
be identifying his emotional disposition, rather than 
his present feelings. 
But to discover whether it is true to say that 
we must feel something to have an emotion we must 
discover what these feelings are. They may be phy-
siological sensations. We can feel cold or nauseous 
with fear, or despair. But these feelings Can be 
explained in terms of the weather, or food, as well. 
When frightened our breathing and heartbeat speed up, 
our throat becomes dry, and our skin goes pale with 
goosepimples. Yet this list does not constitute a 
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sufficient condition for the occurNnce of fear: 
these bodily changes may be due purely to physiological 
processes. Nor are goosepimples, or a dry throat, 
necessary components of feeling frightened. The 
detailed bodily sensations experienced may differ among 
individuals. But perhaps havinq some sensations 
. --
(though not especially sensation a, b, or c) may 
constitute a necessary condition for experiencing 
fear or for that matter any other emotion. W.P.Alston 
makes this point 
"It seems impossible to envisage a clear case 
of an emotional state which does not involve such a 
disturbance, along with sensations of it."l 
This disturbance or "disturbed state of the organism" 
is, according to Alston "a pattern of bodily sensations". 
But is it so impossible to envisage a case of, say, 
mild envy, which does not involve such disturbance, no 
sensations? It may be logically impossible to experience 
rage, or ectasy, or terror, without symptoms like 
increased heartbeat, increased adrenalin, and so on. 
It may also , as a matter of empirical fact be dis-
covered that even the calmer emotions bring about a 
change in the organism - granted of course that 
agreement can be reached on what its undisturbed 
state is. But this is by no means obvious, and can 
thus hardly be part of the meaning of the word 'emotion'. 
It is true that many emotions do affect 
our physiology. (The opposite also holds). It is 
further true that we logically cannot feeL an emotion 
like terror without at least some of the extreme 
physical symptoms associated with it' :we could at the 
most· be called badly frightened. But though physiolo-
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-logical disturbances and sensations may constitute 
necessary conditions for some emotions to occur, they 
do not do so for all. 
No doubt, when I claim to be feeling annoyed 
I am not simply referring to my physiological condition 
- such as feeling hot. Perhaps I am referring to a 
unique feeling that I can identify as 'annoyance'. 
Thus emotions might just be qualitatively distinguishable 
feelings, open to introspection. This formulation of 
what an emotion is has been criticised on three counts. 
Firstly it is dif ficul t to see how we can quali taHvely 
'feel' the difference between, say, rage, annoyance 
and indignatio~, Secondlyif emotions are just feelings 
within us, it should be possible to have any emotion 
about anything. But I cannot logically feel remorseful 
about a mountain view, or proud of the moon. Thirdly 
this model cannot account for the notion of people 
making mistakes about their emotions. I shall discuss 
these three objections in turn. 
Rage and annoyance appear to differ in strength, 
not in quality. This suggests that emotions are inner 
feelings which are quantita~ely as well as qualitatively 
distinguishable. Indignation and annoyance may well 
feel alike, but this should not surprise us, as they 
are closely related emotions. We are not likely to con-
fuse them with embarrasment, or grief. Some differences 
in these feeling components do, then, seem to exist. 
But how can we tell indignation from annoyance, if not 
by feeling? I may be annoyed to find my mail has 
been opened. I will be indignant if I discover 
this was done deliberately to keep an eye on my 
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correspondence. The difference between the two does not 
lie so much in my feelings, but in how I interpret 
the situation. An accidental mistake may annoy me) but 
a breach of my right to private correspondence makes 
me indignant. Seeing an injustice is part of the con-
cept 'indignation'. In the same way we cannot logically 
feel remorse at a mountain view, or proud of the moon. 
Regretting a past deed seems to be a necessary part 
of feeling remorse. Pride applies to things that belong 
to me, or that I have in some sense brought about. Thus 
the moon cannot be the object of my pride - unless 
of course I imagine I am somehow responsible for its 
existence. 
A cognitive factor has entered this analysis 
of emotions. It is this which allows us to distinguish 
between annoyance and indignation and which makes it 
impossible to have any emotion about anythinq.The first 
two objections to seeing emotions as just feelings 
have been sustained, although a feeling component 
of varying type and strength does appear to be presen t 
at times~ for this allows us to distinguigh annoyance 
from grief, or rage. 
Can we be more specific about the cognitive 
element of emotions? R.S.Peters argues that wishing 
(though not wanting) is conceptually linked with emotions. 
" .•. A lover, overwhelmed by his love, may wish 
that he were one with his beloved; but he cannot strictly 
speaking want such a logical impossibility. Vet these 
are just the sorts of thoughts that come into the heads 
of those deeply in 10ve."2 
But even wishing to be at one with one's beloved, or 
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wishing anything in particular at all, does not seem 
to be a necessary condition for love. What 00 we wisR 
for when we feel amused, surprised, moved, or exhilar-
ated? We are interpreting the situation in a certain 
way'. But wishes are not clearly involved. Peters might 
want to argue that amusement is not a clear example 
of an emotion. Yet what else is it? It is a feeling 
that can sweep over us, sometimes at the most in-
appropriate moments. Likewise/when feeling movea, upon 
hearing a piece of music, or at an unexpected show 
of affection or generosity toward us, we need wish 
nothing, yet we certainly seem to be experiencing an 
emotion. According to Peters : 
"A wife who is mourning for her dead husband 
wishes fervently that he were alive."3 
If this wife did not wish her husband alive we would 
indeed conclude that she was not really grieved by 
his death. Thus this particular emotion, grief, does 
seem to have a conceptual link with wishing. But not 
all emotions do. 
Wishing something is not, then, as Peters 
suggested, a necessary condition for having an emotion 
per se, but it may be such for some particular emotions. 
Can we, in any other way, delimit this cogni-
tive factor? Peters again writes: 
"Emotions have in common the fact that they involve 
appraisals elicited by external conditions which are 
of concern to us, or by things which we have brought 
about or suffered. "4 
It is not true that the appraisals we make need have 
any connection with external conditions, though in 
fact of course they often do. But I can have strong 
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emotions about completely imag~nary situations. 
However it does seem true that the appraisal must be 
something that is of concern to us. This is obvious 
in the case of emotions such as anger, hatred or joy. 
But even amusement must 'strike a chord'. Furthermore 
the appraisal must be evaluative in some way. Facts 
about, for instance, the time of day, or the speed of 
a passing car CF :nnot in themselves be the basis of 
a particular emotion. But if we add certain other 
facts and evaluations, such as that we are running late 
for an important appointment, or that school has just 
finished and the safety of children concerns us, we 
can arrive at our feelings of anxiety, or indignation. 
Some such evaluation is not a sufficient 
condition for emotions. I can think it umust that 
someone opened my mail without feeling indignant. I can 
think my situation dangerous, without feeling frightened. 
Is some sort of cognition, appraisal, or evaluation a 
necessary condition for an emotion? The answer to this 
question depends on what we have in mind when we talk 
of 'cognition', or 'appraisal'. I may, but need 
not consciously think "I wish I had that" when I feel 
envious, or "I'm glad that is over" when I feel relieved 
We speak of feelings like envy, or relief 'sweeping 
over us'. It is not clear what kind of cognition is 
involved here. 
We are constantly making judgements, evalua-
tive and otherwise, without being aware of it. We 
'automatically' estimate the speed of cars, and the 
distance across the road. We 'appreciate' a painting 
or a piece of music. We 'sens~'the atmosphere at a 
party. We 'take to' people at fi~st sight. We 'feell 
sorneone's contempt, or amusement. In these examples 
we are appraising something. But it is not a fully 
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conscious process, and it may in fact be very 
difficult to pinpoint just why we like or dislike 
a person - or a book, or a house. It is likely that 
we are evaluating subtle clues about the situations 
or people in terms of our past experience. Sometimes 
we may feel irritated with a person because of 
reasons a, band c, and sometimes we just feel 
irritated with someone for no apparent reason. In the 
latter case we still assume that there must be some 
subconscious reasons for this irritation - for if 
it is always felt toward the same person, he is in 
some sense the object of our irritation, even if we 
are not sure why. Through seeing him in a different 
context, or perhaps hearing someone else's descrip-
tion of him (maybe in terms of his pompous manner, or 
chauvenistic attitude) we sometimes discover later 
why a person irritated us. 
But what about the very general feelings of 
irritation, depression or for that matter, happiness 
which we sometimes experience, and which do not appear 
to be connected to any appraisal we make? Or the 
specific feelings of enjoyment which I may get from 
sunbathing, but not from swimming. Are these emotions 
which lack a cognitive core? This question is made 
difficult by 
which appears 
prove that we 
be happy with 
the 
to 
can 
our 
notion of subconscious appraisals, 
'/ 
make it impossible _tl"l p:rinciple to 
have non-cognitive emotions. We may 
situation at a consciou~ level, and 
yet feel depressed. All introspection and psycho~analysis 
may fail to reveal any repressed appraisals. Yet 
this cannot constitute conclusive evidence against their 
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existence. But it does at least constitute some 
evidence . And there are alternative explanations which 
should be explorec. One is the purely physiological 
one. We find that when we are tired, run down, or 
undergoing certain bodily changes (such as some women 
in their menopause) we often become depressed and 
morose. Our irritation may be due to a headache, 
or a bout of flu. Sometimes things like the weather 
affect us. Wind may make us feel exhilarated, sun 
contented. 
But should we call these things emotions? 
John Wilson thinks not: 
"Emotions may be distinguished from moods. Emo-=: 
tions characteristically have tarqets or objects."5 
Of course the sun might be called the object of my 
contentment, in which case this, at least, would be an 
example of a non-cognitive emotion. But must 
emotions have objects at all? The feeling element of 
my depression at, say, the state of my w~rk, is 
so similar to the feeling element of my depression which 
has no target or object, that is seems strange to call 
one an emotion,_ and the other not. Similarly my 
bursting into tears for no reason seems to be as 
much an expression of an emotion, as my bursting 
into tears because things are going badly, and that 
happy feeling I have when they improve is identical 
to a happy feeling I sometimes have which does not 
correlate to my situation at all.For this reason I 
find it more useful to include moods under the 
general term, 'emotions'. In this case there are emotions 
for which the question "Why are you feeling like that?" 
cannot be answered in terms of an appraisal: I just 
happen to feel happy, or to enjoy the sun. 
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An appraisal of our situation is therefore 
neither a necessary, nor a sufficient condition for 
somethin9 to be an emotion, although it is necessary 
for some individual emotions such as remorse, and pride. 
This leads us to an important distinction. 
We must appraise our feelings, even if we are not 
aware of making any appraisal of our situation. If I 
am conscious of feeling happy I must have identified 
a certain pleasant feeling of emotional well-being 
wi thin r • myself. But I need not know why I feel that 
way, and even when I do think I know why, that explana-
tion need not be in terms of any appraisal I have 
made of my situation. Suppose that I feel happy whilst 
at the beach. I may not. know why. Or I may attribute 
the feelings to physiological factors and the intermit-
tent sensations of hot sun, warm sand and cool water. 
Or I may attribute the feelinq to the appraisal I make 
of my situation: here I am enjoying a lazy, comfortable 
time at the beach rather than sitting inside doing some 
boring job. Or I may attribute my feelin9 of happiness 
to a combination of physiological causes, and my situ-
ation. Only in the case of those emotions conceptually 
connected to an appraisal of my circumstances does 
the distinction fall .away.When I feel remorseful, the 
appraisal by which I identify my emotion and the apprai-
sal of my situation become one :end the same thing. Re-
cognizing my emotion as remorse is dependent upon 
appraising a past action of mine as one to be morally 
regretted. 
The third objection to seeing emotions simplY 
as inner feelings was that this would not allow us to 
make sense of the notion of people being mistaken about 
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their emotions. This notion is now not straight 
forward. Perhaps we could be mistaken about what we 
attribute our emotion to: our appraisal of the situation, 
or, for instance, our physiological condition. Or per~ 
haps we could be mistaken about the particular apprai-
sal to which we attribute our emotion. Or perhaps we 
could be mistaken about the very feeling we are 
experiencing : we might think we are enjoyin~ a party 
whereas really we are bored. 
How could we establish whether someone is, 
or could be mistaken about his emotions in any 6£ 
these three ways? Take the first. Suppose we have a 
friend who is very open about her feelings to us. We 
have noted that she is generally cheerful except 
when she has not eaten for some time.Then she becomes 
irritable, and sees every situation in its worst 
possible light. As soon as she has some food she 
cheers up. Suppose this is a very consistent pattern. 
When hungry she might attrihute her depression and 
irritation to the situation she finds herself in. 
We can make a case that she is mistaken and that the 
cause of her emotion is really lack of food: as 
time and time again the only thina that chagge~,which 
correlates with a change in her emotions is that she 
eats something. We can produc~ rather similar example 
for the second way in which someone might be mistaken 
about their emotions. Suppose again we have a friend 
who is very open about his feelings to us. He seems to 
love his job: unless he, on rare occasions, shares 
an office with someone else: when he cannot find a 
good thing to say about the job, or any aspect of it. 
If this is again a consistent pattern, we can make a 
case that, on those occasions our friendrs annoyance 
is due to his having to share the office, rather than 
to his appraisal of the Job itself. 
Both these examples are dependent upon the 
per~on being frank about his feelings. We ourselves 
discover mistakes we have maae a bout our own emotions 
in the same way that others do. But the third way sug-
gested in which we could possibly be mistaken about our 
emotions is more difficult. Can we ever be wrong in 
identifying the very feeling we~aFe experiencing? 
Could someone else ever show us we were thus mistaken? 
We would expect to have here the same kind of private 
knowledge that we have of thoughts and physical 
sensations. Notions of mistakenly identifying our 
thoughts as being about cricket when they are really 
about the weather, seem odd. Yet talk of being mis-
taken , or fooling ourselves about our feelings is 
relatively common. The evidence produced to prove such 
mistakes is usually based on our behaviour, subsequent 
recollections of our feelings, and sometimes on latent 
expressions of emotions (for instance in dreams, or l 
under psycho-analysis). The reliability of these sources 
of evidence must be questioned. 
Any deduction about my emotions ~rom my 
behaviour other than verbal expressions, must be based 
on an assumption that there is, if not a loqical, the~n 
- '--' 
at least a strong contingent connection between the twp. 
Is this so? Having an emotion does not necessitate any 
particular action. I may run away when frightened, or 
I may do nothing at all. I may leave when I feel bored, 
or hit people when I feel angry, but I need not. Perhaps 
the tendency to act remains, even if I refrain for other 
reasons. But what sort of action do I tend toward 
when I feel sad, or delighted, or proud? I may wish that 
the cause of my sadness were rectified, but I need 
14 
have no tendency to act. In the cases of delight and 
pride, a suitable action does not even spring to mind. 
This difficulty we have of even thinkinq of an action 
which might be appropriately linked with these feelings 
show that even a strong contingent link between 
emotions and actions is unlikely. A conceptual one 
is non-existent: there is nothing contradictory about 
non-active indignation, although this emotion 
word may be more closely associated with action than, 
say, delight, because it also operates as a motive word. 
However when another person claims that I 
was' enjoying myself, or seemed sad, or seemed annoyed 
at a particular time, he does not usually speak of 
my purposive action, but of what he took to be overt 
expressions of my emotion: my face, eyes, voice, gestures 
and so on. There is aga~n no logical connection between 
,say, my feeling happy, or amused, and smiling, or 
between being anno;?ed and frownli1l1g;; But we do have 
a whole network of expectations. We rleouce from certain 
facial expressions, ways of talking, or moving, that 
someone is feeling proud, or elated, or disdainful. 
Once again it is often difficult for us to pinpoint 
the reasons for such deductions. Why eo we think some-
one seems. contemptious, or gleeful? The clues are subtle. 
Furthermore we will be involved in making a series of 
complicated judgements about the person's situation, 
his personality, and the way in which most people 
would feel, given his circumstances. Our own feelings 
must often affect these judgem~nks. Upon seeing a 
man's serious face as he watches his flirtatious wife, we 
might assume that he is jealous. In fact he might just 
be trying to remember the name of her newly-found 
partner. Such mistakes seem inevitable, especially as 
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people need not show any signs of their emotions at all. 
I can 'boil inwardly~ with rage and 'burn within' 
with desire. Thus, although we do in fact often judge 
a person's emotions from his behaviour, ana outward 
expressions, it would seem presumptious to assume' 
we can just 'read off' the emotions of others with any 
great accuracy, and even more presumptious to think 
that we know what another person is feeling, better 
than they do. Though there may be cases where the 
accumulated evidence in terms of behaviour and 
appearances lends some supp:ort for such presumption. 
What if we ourselves think we have 
mis--identified our emotion? This cannot be an easy 
matter to decide, for there is no reason to suppose 
that emotions come singly. I may enjoy flyin~ and 
yet feel afraid at the same time. I may be annoyed 
about the noise made by some children, and yet feel 
envious of their exhuberance. Some emotions do appear 
t? be mutually exclusive: it seems incongruous 
that boredom and enjoyment could be felt simultaneously. 
Yet even this is possible for we speak of experiencing 
feeling at 'different levels'. We might be enjoying ~ 
ourselves in a superficial way, but 'deep down' feel 
bored , while at a third level finding amusement in 
watching ourselves perform in a particular social 
setting. In these examples we make our appraisals 
from different vantage points. We speak of 'stepping 
outside ourselves', of 'watching ourselves'. 
How then can I ever know that my appraisal 
of what I am feeling is mistaken? What sense can 
be made of talk about 'becoming aware of yourself' , 
and 'not fooling yourself'1 Suppose we think we 
. 
are enjoying a party, but upon being challenged 
'realize' that we are bored. Can we know that we were 
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bored all the time? Our feelings and appraisals may 
have changed at that moment. Can we be sure that our 
recollection is not affected by our present emotions? 
We may never be ahle to prove conclusively that we had 
misidentified our emotions. But we can produce certain 
sorts of evidence for such a conclusion. Our 
realization at the party may be that we assumed 
rather than felt our enjoyment, as that is what 
parties are for. Thus we may have mistakenly deduced 
our feelings from our appraisal of the situation (This 
is a party, therefore I must be enjoying myself) rather 
than having appraised the actual feelings we were 
experiencing (a heavy unpleasant feeling). Such mistakes 
seem less likely in the case of strong feelings, for 
we would be able to appraise them more easily. How 
could I overlook fee11ngs of extreme boredom in myself? 
But suppose someone makes what I consider to 
be an unjust and harsh judgement about me. I may 
listen with apparent calm and think myself unaffected. 
But later I find myself repeatedly reliving the scene 
in a manner that is anything but calm. Perhaps this 
is an example of straight forward delayed reaction: 
I really was not upset until I rethought the episode. 
But I may have been mistaken about my initial reactio n 
in the sense that my appraisal of my emotions was not 
comprehensive enough. I calmly dismissed the judgement 
made about me because it differed from what I took to 
be my mwn more informed assesment of myself and my 
situation. But I ignored my reactions such as "How could 
he think that of me?"; "How dare he be so confident when 
he knows so little?"j"How can people judge others like 
/' 
that?" ; "Why has he such deeIjlI .. lseated prej udice." I '! 
was not mistaken when I id.Eint£tied my reaction to 
what was said as one of calm indifference. But I ove~ 
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Looked emotions ranging from astOl1:"'ishment through 
'-' 
to indignation, and sadness in myself. 
What can we now, at last, say about feelings 
and emotions. It has become clear that the two concepts 
are not synonomous. For it is not the 'feel' but 
tm, appmis. al of our situation which sep~rates an 
emotion like indignation from one such as annoyance. 
The feeling element does indeed seem to be a force 
with~in us . It can range from pleasant to unpleasant, 
from weak to strong, and trom tranquil to turbulent, 
whilst amusement tends to be more pleasant, weak and 
tranquil. Some emotions do not of course fit neatly 
into such categories. We may feel pleasantly surprised 
to run into an old acquantance, and sadly surprised 
to hear he is recovering from a serious illness. Thus 
unless we obtain some information about what sort of 
surprise a person has experienced, we cannot judge it 
to be pleasant or unpleasant. 
Even if we cannot name the particular feel-
ing we are experiencing, we can still appraise it in 
terms of how strong, turbulent and unpleasant (or 
otherwise) it is. We can, in fact, at times say little 
else, except that we are feeling 'funny', or 'strange' 
or 'tense'. We may not be aware of any physiological' 
sensations accompagding it. But though I may be unable 
to name my feeling, or to relate it to my situation 
as I see.,·i t , I would nevertheless claim to be experien-
cing an emotion. I w~nt to argue , in other words 
'--" 
that whenever I have a feeling, I have an emotion. But 
having a feeling is not sufficient for having 
certain individual emotions, such a's remorse or terror 
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which are conceptually connected to our appraisal 
of our situation,aild certain physiological sensations, \ 
respective1y.Neither is having a feeling necessary 
for having an emotion. The following can be recognized 
as a description of jealousy: "I felt quite calm las 
I congratulated him, but the thought that it should 
have been me, would not leave me." Or a description of 
grief:"My body felt very numb; I kept thinking 'Oh, no 
he is dead', but I could feel nothing at all." 
Having a feeling is then a sufficient, but 
not a necessary condition for having:>~ erootion!>. But 
it does not follow from this that having a feeling 
is a sufficient condition for having~ particular 
emotion, such as remorse. 
The ccnc:ept of an emotion is, like many others, 
at least in part a cluster concept. This means that a 
number of factors combined make up the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of anyone of the class of 
things we call 'emotions'. ~aking soroe sort of 
appraisal is indeed a necessary condition for having 
'---- -
an emotion. But this appraisal may be of our situation 
(including gertain wishes we might have) in the ease 
of emotions like indignation. or pride, or grief, or 
it may merely be a very minimal appraisal of the 
feelings we are experiencina: in cases such as happiness, 
or depression. Physiological sensations, although per-
haps necessary for some individual emotions, do not 
constitute a necessary, or a sufficient condition 
for all emotions, whilst actions and overt expressions 
of feelings are not conceptually connected to emotions 
at all: though there might be a contingent link. 
The proof for this formulation of the 
concept of emotions lies with the common day usuage 
of individual emotion words. Different words stress 
different aspects of our emotions: t~rror and em-
barr~ment highlight the physiological condition. 
Love and sorrow seem more closely connected to 
feelings, pride and remorse to appraisals of our 
situation. Some emotion words have information 
about their intensity written into them~ ectasy 
cannot be mild, nor amusement overwhelming. Some 
emotions require a more detailed appraisal of the 
situation than others: feeling embarrassed and 
feeling self-conscious may be subspecies of a 
general feeling of inadequacy. 
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Thus this exposition of what an emotion is 
will be valid if all concepts which we want to include 
in the class of things called~motions/can be adequately 
analysed in terms of combinations of our physiological 
sensations, appraisals of our feelings, and appraisals 
of our situation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EMOTIONS,RATIONALITY and EDUCATION 
We cannot/strictly speaking, educate the 
emotions. We educate people, not parts of people. We 
can however educate people in particular respects. , ) 
Thus we could consider educating children with regards 
to~their emotions. It is useful to call this 'education 
of the emotions'; in the same way that religious 
education means educating children in the field of 
religion. We cannot spea~ of 'emotional education' 
because this suggests we are re~ferring to the nature 
'-' 
of the education, rather than to the particular 
sphere of education we are concerned with. What ,then, 
is education of the emotions? Much has been written 
about the concept of education. Suffice it to say 
that I am interested in that concept which-concerns 
the increase of individual freedom, and the power 
of self-determination. A f~ller and more rational 
understanding of the world and ourselves reduces the 
number of apparently arbitrary forces that shape our 
lives, and allows us to find realistic means to 
achieve realistic ends. 
Our emotions are often seen as one of the 
forces that victimise us. We speak of anger sweeping 
over uS y or love welling up inside us, and of relief 
flooding through us. We are familiar with finding 
our feelings at odds with our beliefs. Yet we hold 
people at least partially responsible for their 
emotions. We tell them to stop worrying, not to be 
jealous, to control their anger, and bo discard 
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their self-pity. To make any sense of this apparent 
contradiction we must remember that our emotions stem 
from physiological and subconscious sources, as well 
as from consciousness. It is obviously important to 
discover what our educational aims are to be in the 
field of the emotions. 
In his book "Education in Religion and the 
Emotions' John Wilson asks in what ways we can fail 
with regards our emotions. He draws the answers he 
obtains from this question up into a detailed taxonomy 
of components which he believes allow us to identify 
the emotionally educated person. Our aims for the 
education of emotions, he argues, should therefore be 
the development of these components. Summarised 
his taxonomy reads as follows: 
A(i)Relevant cognitive C:~ AUTEMP 
abilities and attain-
awareness of one's 
own emotions. 
awareness of others' 
emotions 
B 
c 
ments (rKnowing that') ALLEMP 
GIG (I) 
(ii)Relevant aptitudes GIG(2) 
& techniques('knowing 
knowledge of facts 
'knowing that' 
'know-how' ,social and 
other relevant skills 
how' ) . KRAT ( I) 
Bringing (i) & (ii) 
to bear. 
Feeling rightly as 
result of bringing 
(i) & (ii) to bear. 
KRAT(la) 'noticing' 
'thinking 
KRAT(lb) 'thinking fully' 
KRAT(lc) 'taking responsibility' 
KRAT(2) right emotion 
I 
Let us look at all this in more detail. There 
is firstly good reason to encourage AUTEMP, or in 
other words, the appraisal of our feelings in as 
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detailed a manner as possible. Just as we expect 
education to help our understanding of the world, so 
we can reasonabl¥ expect it to help our understanding 
of ourselves. Suppose that I only know that I have 
an unpleasant tense feeling, but not whether this is 
because I am tired, and depressed, or because I am 
worried about an approaching deadline, or because I 
an envious of a friend who is enjoying his holiday. I 
will then not be able to scrutinize any beliefs and 
values underlying this feeling, nor will I be able 
to take any :action which might appear appropriate. 
Not having identified my feeling, I will not wonder 
whether the deadline really matters, or whether 
my friend is in fact enjoying himself, or whether I 
ought to take some rest. If we cannot identify our 
emotions we will not know that our view of a situation 
could be coloured. Suppose,for example,that the people 
at a social function strike me as hypocritical, their 
attempts at enjoyment forced. If I realize that I am 
tired and depressed, I may see that my judgement possi-
bly reflects my own mood, rather than a lack of 
sincerity on the part of anyone else. Being aware of 
our feelings is then a necessary condition for increaseo 
objectivity. EncQur~gi~g objectivity is certainly 
educationally justifiable. 
The identification of an emotion can not 
in itself decide its rationality. Judgin~ that a 
feeling I have is unpleasant is part of the concept 
of feeling depressed. In the same way it seems 
logically impossible to dislike the feeling aspect 
of happiness. These feelings are in themselves non-
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-rational in the way that pain is. But what if I some-
times do seem to enjoy my own depression, or dislike 
my own happiness? I may want to foster my image as 
a sensitive person, or attract sympathy from other 
people. Here l!1y appraisal has changed. I am no longer 
just identifying my feelings, but rather a~praising 
my situation (which in this case includes the fact 
of my own depression, or happiness). 
By properly identifying our emotions we can 
scrutinize any underlying beliefs. Some emotions are 
conceptually linked to particular appraisals. I must.-
, for example, believe that I have something to feel 
proud of, or something to feel remorseful about, in 
order to feel those emotions. But other emotions have 
no such link, and I can certainly feel anxious or 
frightened without being able to point to an appraisal 
of my situation which supports such anxiety, or fear. 
Our emotions are irrational if we do not know what 
beliefs they are based on, or if they are based on 
unsupported beliefs. (Lack of Wilson's GIG(l)). 
For example my contempt for people of another race· 
is irrational if I do not know what beliefs this contempt 
is based on, or if I do hold certain beliefs about this 
race for which I can produce little or no evidence. 
Awareness of the emotions of other people (ALLF.MP), is 
only necessary in cases where those emotions are part 
of the situation we are appraising. I need have no 
knowledge of the feelings of anyone else when I am 
annoyed at missing a bus, unless of course I am ann-
oyed becauseI am considering the feelings of someone 
affected by my being late. 
Secondly, then, to the extent that education 
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develops our knowledge and understanding of our world 
(including other people) to that extent it helps us 
to become rational in our emotions. For any increase 
in understanding will allow us to be more realistic 
in our interaction with our social and physical 
environment and thus be better equipped to cope 
emotionally. The frustrations causec! by unfamiliar and 
misjudged situations often result in forms of 
irrational emotional response. 
But such a general increase in awareness 
and understanding of our own emotions, and of the 
beliefs and values underlying our emotions, provide ~ 
the necessary, but not the sufficient conditions 
for being more rational about our emotions. I may 
recognize my own depression (AUTEMP), without 
considering the effect this might have on my obser-
vations of others. I may know that someone else will 
be upset (ALLEMP) at my being late, and yet not worry 
about missing my bus. And learning that my beliefs 
about another race are mistaken (GIG(I» may not 
quell my contempt. Wilson explains the different 
categories of such failure in KRAT(I): 
" .. an older pupil is present whf=m a nervous new 
boy comes into the playground. He may (a) be so 
out of touch with the real world that he fails even 
to notice the new boy, or fails to notice that he 
is new, or that he is crying" or (b) he notices this, 
but doesn't bother to think seriously about what it 
must be like to be a new boy, surrounded by strangers: 
~r(c~ he does all this, and thinks vaguely 'Poor 
kid", or 'It must be rotten for him! ,or 'Somebody 
ought to go and talk to him', but these thoughts do not 
represent any serious belief that he ouqht to feel 
(and display) sympathy." 2 --
This particular example concerns a moral situation, 
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but the general aim at stake here appears to be a 
commitment to rational and responsible thinking in 
every aspect of life. It is far too common to find 
people unwilling to use for topics of personal 
concern,the standard of thinking they might emp~, 
for instance, in their professional life. In fact it 
is most difficult to be rational about the beliefs 
in which we have invested the greatest emotional 
content. 
Thus ouR third aim in the education of the 
emotions is to encourage the objective consideration 
of all the evidence availabe (including that which 
may contradict certain beliefs we hold) and the 
ability to take seriously this evidence and change 
our beliefs accordingly. Perhaps this can be summed 
up as the ability to be rationally flexible, or 
open minded. 
We may however appraise our situation 
clearly and carefully and yet find that our feelings 
do not fall into line with our beliefs . This is 
a failure in Wilson's KRAT(2). I may, for instance 
enjoy lightning, but feel frightened of thunder. I 
may be fully aware that the danger lies in the lightning 
not the thunder. ,but this may not alter my feelings. 
But I can in a sense disown them, by recognizing 
their discrepancy~~ith the facts. Furthermore here 
we may be able to bring certain skills to bear (these 
could come into Wilson's GIG(2)). For there are 
a great many ways in which we can attempt to alter 
what we ours~~ves recognize to be irrational emotions. 
Sometimes mere recognition of the irrationality will 
change them. But beyond that we may find that such 
emotions lessen if we confide in someone, and talk 
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our feelings out - perhaps many times. Or we 
may just constantly remind ourselves of the beliefs 
which contradict our emotions. Some emotions are 
thought to stem from experiences in our past which 
have embedded themselves, if not necessarily in 
our conscious memory, then certainly in our 
subconscious. We may attempt to recall these experien-
ces in order to get them into perspective arld realize 
their limited relevance to the present. There are a 
variety of other methods by which we might come to 
terms with our past , including hypnotism, role 
playing, and other forms o~acting. We may attempt 
to condition ourselves out of the. emotional effects 
of our past. Thus we can try to overcome our fear 
of motorbikes by spending a lot of time on and around 
them. Or we may conscioWly alter our environment~if 
I wish to eradicate my feelings of ~contempt towards 
another race, I can immerse myself in their culture 
and ensure that I meet members of that race on a day 
to day basis. Sometimes purposive changes in behaviour 
can have some effect: by laughing and joking to hide 
our fear, the danger may seem less real and take 
on comic proportions. Finally we can affect our emotions 
through such practices as meditation and yoga among 
others, and by means of a number of chemicals such 
as tranquilizers and amphetamines. 
I am not suggesting that we, as educators 
should set out to alter the emotions of children, by 
for instance, giving them tranquilizers, or whatever. 
I am suggesting that we should make children aware 
that tranquilizers are one of a number of ways by which 
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they can affect their emotions, shouln they choose 
to. Obviously the above is by no means a complete list. 
The important thing is that there are ways in which ',' 
we can attempt to change our emotions, when we recognize 
them to be irrational!: when, in other words, we fail 
in KRAT (2) . 
Therefore our fourth educational aim can be 
to impart relevant information, artC'. relevant skills 
which will allow us to come to terms with our emotions 
more succesfully. This may include the realization 
that our attempts to eliminate a certain emotion 
are limited. Yet even then we retain an element of 
freedom, because knowing this we can be careful not 
to place ourselves in situations in which certain 
emotions, or tensions within ourselves arise. Suppose, 
for example, that a person upon seeing certain sorts 
of films , becomes extremely ~pset and frustrated at 
his own impotence to solve the problems depicted 
on screen/He will agree that this is quite irrational: 
there is no way in which he can play a role in the 
events set down on film. He may find however, that 
regardless of how he tries , at certain times he 
cannot divorce himself sufficiently from the situation 
and remember that it is only a film. He may then choose 
to avoid certain films which will upset him greatly, 
for little appare~t purpose: such as films which 
include a lot of senseless physical and interpe~sonal 
violence. 
So far so good. It is not my purpose to 
discuss the ways in which the list of components put 
for:ward by Wilson can be developed in children. Any 
methods must be scrutinized to ensure that they are 
in themselves educationally justifiable, but there is 
undoubtedly a wide range of activities, from the more 
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orthodox teaching situation, to things like non-
verbal interaction exercises, which can be employed. 
It is my purpose to draw attention to 
the fact that our focus has been very much on irrational 
emotions: on emotions which do not appear to be 
based on any conscious appraisals, or on appraisals ;', 
which contain unsupported or unsupportable beliefs, or 
on emotions which contradict our conscious appraisals. 
But , as I have already mentioned, in the previous 
chapter, the appraisals of our situations must in some 
way be evaluative. Take for instance, Wilson's 
example of the older pupil and the nervous new boy. The 
step from noticing the new boy crying, to thinking one 
ought to feel and display sympathy could not be made 
without plugging in some value judgement about the 
importance of valuing ana. being concerned_for 
other people. What help can rationality be to us here? 
Wilson himself writes: 
"We should resist, therefore, any suggestion 
that the justification of wants and emotions should 
proceed by identifying a number or class of objects 
that are 'truly'desirablA , pitiable, fearful, 
lovable ,and so on, or the more obviously naive 
view naturally following from this that if a man 
has correct beliefs about an object he will thereby 
at once know what he ought to feel about it, and 
feel what he ought to feel. To such general questions 
as'What sort of things ought to be desired or 
feared (pitied, loved etc)?' we can return no answer 
that is of permanent value to the educator." 3 
~ow then, can we ever know that we are fe~ling the 
'~ight'emotion? Is there anything the educator can 
say, in other words ,about the value element present 
in emotions? 
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Suppose a person claims to enjoy wars. And 
suppose that we ensure that he is not just reporting 
the feeling he happen. s to have regarding war~ In 
other words, he is not just appraising his own 
feelings, he is in fact appraising the situation:war. 
~d suppose we find no failure on his part in terms 
of the EMP,GIG, or KRAT components: in other words 
he is aware of, and has thought carefully about the 
various facets of wars and people involved in them 
(This is of course, a very big supposition). Can 
we, as educators, now do nothing but" accept that this 
person just happens to enjoy wars? 
We can begin by questioning him a little 
closer. Does he mean he enjoys reading about wars, 
because they make exciting history? Does he enjoy 
the real thing? Which aspect of war does he enjoy? 
Does he enjoy the various strategies of battle; 
or the ingenious weapons used;or the atmosphere of 
excitement; or the capture and torture of men in 
combat; or the maiming and killing of civilians? If 
he only enjoys some of these, for instance the strate-
gies, and excitement, we can ask him to weigh up the 
value of these (which we can after all find in sport) 
against the other consequences of war. He may claim 
to enjoy every aspect of war. If he can happily 
see himself, or anybody else (including people who 
hate pain and bloodshed, or people close to him) in 
whatever war situation we depict for him (and 
we can use whatever means available to make this 
depicting as realistic as possible) he may really 
enjoy war. But our discussion need not end there. We 
can bring out the implications of his enjpyment in 
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terms of lack of concern for his own life, or that of 
anyone else. We can examine many other values he 
holds, and demand that he be consistent (rational). 
And we can point out to him the ways (if any) in 
which his behaviour or actions do not bear out the 
values which he claims to hold. 
In other words the answer "Yes, I know all 
that, but I still enjoy it" (be it war, or whatever) 
need not be the last word that can be spoken on the 
subject. It is true that fundamental disagreements 
can exist on questions of value. It is-.:"not true 
that rational discussion can do nothing to clarify 
and sometimes to resolve such disagreements. If 
our concern is to increase children's rationality, then 
it will also be to encourage them to explore the 
nature and implications of their own, and other peo~l¢s, 
emotions and value judgements in as full a manner as 
possible. This, our fifth aim in the education of the 
emotions, is one which is curiously absent in John 
Wilson's work. For he, rightly I think, warns 
educators against deciding what should be thought 
"'truly· desirable, pitiable, fearful, lovable, and so 
on." But the end result of his taxonomy, of being 
emotionally educated, is feeling 'rightly', or having 
the right emotions. Wilson writes : 
"Given the relevant abilities plus KRAT(I), 
then the person will have deployed or brought to 
bear his abilities on the situation, and will then 
know what he ought to feel and how he ought to act."4 
But what of the person who brings to bear all the 
~bilit.tes, and still does not know what he ought to feel; 
For not only can controversy rage publicly over the 
question of values, but also we privately can be very 
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confused about how we ought to feel. 
Wilson uses three examples to illustrate 
the different ways in which we can fail in KRA.T (I). The 
first is that of a pharisee attending a meeting deter-
mining what is to be Jesus's fate, and failing to 
realize that he ought to feel pity. The second, which 
I have already referred to , is the case of the 
older pupil who fails to realize that he ought to 
feel sympathy for the new boy. And the third one 
is that of a girl who fails to realize that she ought 
not feel attracted to the sort of man who is trying 
to begin a relationsh~p with her. It is apparent that 
the first two exampJes involve moral values. And it 
is because they are moral values which are commonly 
held that Wilson can slip so easily from knowledge of 
the facts of the situation, to knowledge of what one 
ought to feel. If we believe that other people 
deserve our concern, then it is not difficult to see 
the innocent, or the frightened deserve our pity, and 
our sympathy. The third example could be moral (if 
the girl ought not to become involved with the sort of 
man who, say, would cheat on his wife) or prudential 
(if the girl ought not become involved with the sort 
of man who, say, is liable to become violent). Let us 
look at these examples in a slightly different way 
to show how difficult it can be to discover how we ought 
to feel. What ought the Pharisee feel toward those 
out to crucify an innocent man? What ought the older 
pupil feel toward pupils teasing the new boy? What 
ought the girl feel toward "that sort of man" if not 
attraction? Ought each, or any of these feel anger, 
or hatred, or contempt, or pity, or Christian love •.. 
or nothing? Not only we, but also they may find it 
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difficult to answer nhat question. This is why our 
fifth educational aim must be the rational consideration 
of a wide range of values, including eur own. This 
constitutes an essential element of any education 
of the emotions, and one not brought out by Wilson.' 
The five aims which have emerged from this 
chapter all fall under the heading of increasing the 
level of rationality at which people operate. We are 
often made out to beat the mercy of our emotions. 
Learning to identify our emotions in some detail (the 
first aim) will allow us to examine the rationality 
of the beliefs (the second aim) and of the values 
(the fifth aim) involved in the appraisals underlying 
those emotions. A serious attempt to be rational and 
responsible about such an examination (the third aim) 
will enable us to deal with emotions which contradict 
in ~ome way the conscious appraisals we make (the 
fourth aim). To~ether these will increase our ability 
to become agents, rather than victims of our emotions. 
It is very important not to underestimate the role 
rationality plays in our attempts to come to terms with 
our emotions. 
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We must not underestimate the role 
rationality plays in our attempt to co~e to terms 
with our emotions. 
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But neither must we overestimate it. The question 
Wilson poses: 'What ou~h~ I to feel' is not only 
difficult: it is not ~i~ays a useful question.Anyone 
attempting to educate the emotions feces sowe 
difficult questions about matters of value, ~right' 
emotions, and the distinction between indoctrination 
and education • 
Wilson's approach is useful in the examples 
of the last chapter' :where the rationality of the 
appraisal is in question. But note that correcting an 
irrational belief can only help us decide what we 
ought not to feel. I ought not to feel indignant if 
my belief that my mail has been tampered with, is 
mistaken.But conversely, my discovery that my mail 
has been tampered with need not, in itself, lead me 
to conclude that I ought to be indignant. The extra 
required are our values and ideals: these deterwine 
whether we ought to feel respect for our parents, or 
envy another's good fortune. The reason why Wilson 
has focussed on having the right emotion, and on 
knowing how we ought to feel (without giving much 
consideration to how we determine which is the right 
emotion) is, I think, because he is concerned particu-
larly with "anyone who fails to feel the 'right' 
emotions or fails to handle his emotions properly" 1 
- and because he has concentrated on the area of 
morali ty, and is himseaf working with at least some J. 
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notion of an ideal human . 
But Wilson's for~ula, expressed in his 
taxonomy,does not apply to a significant section of 
our emotion experiences. Take firstly the case where 
I merely identify my emotion. Suppose that I feel 
happy, or depressed ana that these feelings do not 
appear to be connected to any appraisal I have made 
of my situation. We often say :"It has nothing to 
do with anythin~else, it is just the way I am feeling." 
We may even be able to track down the causes of such 
feelings: perhaps in terms of physiological, or 
unconscious factors. But if I am not feeling happy 
or depressed about anything, then these feelings are 
nonrational. There is nothing in our situation which. 
can suggest that we ought not to feel happy or 
depressed, because our feelings do not reflect our 
situation in the first place. And if we do not adhere 
to any value judgements about being or not beinq happy 
or depressed, we will have no reason to think either 
that we ought, or that we ought not to feel the way 
we do. We will just accept our feelings. 
This example does not count against Wilson 
however. For he distinguishes emotions from moods. Let 
me therefore turn to e:rnotions which do hcve objects~ 
or targets, as he calls them. Suppose I aIP looking 
at Mt.Cook. I may feel awe, or amazement, or fasci-
nation, or love, or boredom - to mention but a few. 
·Suppose I now ask myself~ "What ought I to feel about 
Mt.Cook?" Each of the emotions mentioned is a valid one. 
In fact it is difficult to think of any e~otion which 
I ought not to feel: unless I am committed to a human 
ideal which dictates a specific emotional response 
to mountains If such as, perhaps, awe. Some emotions I 
might claim to feel, do appear nonsensical~ for instance 
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jealousy. This is because normally the concept of 
jealousy applies to people, not to things: though in 
a metaphoric way we could even feel jealous of, say, 
Mt.Cook's beauty. The difficulty we have in naming 
the emotion we ought to feel shows that this is again 
one of the cases where we just register a certain 
emotion in reaction to an aspect of the situation 
we are in. The emotion does have an object. But the 
only relevant criteria for deciding what we ought 
to feel, seems to be what we do feel. Ought I to 
enjoy, or hate riding my Honda 50? I simply accept my 
enjoyment , or lack or it. 
Let us look at a more complex situation. 
Suppose that my bike has broken down, and that I 
feel annoyed because "this will prevent JTle from going 
out for a ride. Let us assume that I am right about 
the facts of the situation: my bike has broken down, 
and this will prevent me going out. I might now 
consider that perhaps I ought to feel pleased about 
my broken down bike, as it will keep me at home to 
get on with my work (and let us again assume that 
I will indeed work). Whether I ought to feel pleased 
depends on whether I value getting on with my work 
more than going out. My annoyance is an indication that 
on a short time view I han rather go out. But I could 
decide that in the long run my work is more important. 
For what sorts of reasons could I decide that? Perhaps 
because I like my work, or because I like gettin~g my 
work done, or because I am anxious to please other 
people who like me to get my work done, or because 
I think my work ought to get done because it ms 
instrumental in achieving something else which I value 
or because I am just getting embarrassed about not 
finishing my work - and so on. All these reasons, iH 
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a more or less direct way, come back to certain emotions 
or emotional dispositions I have. For those situations 
where I value something because in a direct way I lo~e 
like, or desire it, and where considerations of other 
people, or some ideal, do not ~nter into it, the 
question of how I ought to feel can again he answered 
according to the only criteria relevant: the way I do,-,',. 
feel. Thus if I am pleased to be getting on with my 
work purely because I value my work and I value my 
work purely because I get pleasure out of doing it, then 
I am pleased to get on with my work because I gain 
pleasure from it. 
Is it true that all our values are in an im-
portant way related to the emotional dispositions, or 
emotional preferences we have? Let us suppose that 
I am considering wha~her or not shopli~ting is morally 
justified. I may ,in fact,have a strong emotional 
reaction against shoplifting, perhaps because of the 
way in which I have bee~brought up. But this is not 
the most relevant criteria upon which I can base my 
moral judgement. Here Wilson's taxonomy can be usefully 
applied: I need to consider fully (KRAT(l)) the feelings 
of others (ALLEMP), the consequences of shoplifting, 
both for me personally and for the community at large (GIG). 
Let us suppose that I can draw some kind of picture of 
what society will he like if not only I, but others 
frequently shoplift. But this picture will not in itself 
decide whether I think shoplifting morally justified. 
If I conclude that increased shoplifting will break down 
our present system of supply and demand I might consider 
that bad - or good. (I can argue that our system 
artificially creates demand for the sake of a few 
who stand to benifit by meeting it) In the last 
analysis I will be arguing about human happiness, 
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and quality of life. I ne~d not adhere to majority 
opinion: I could be the only one who thought 
shoplifting morally justified (it is in fact far 
easier to make a fist of justifying shoplijting in 
general, than it is to justify shopJif~ing jnstcthose 
things you personally want). But if I am indeed 
making a moral judgement it must have univers~bility. 
In other words, I must not only be saying that I 
prefer a world in which people shoplift (though this 
is part of what I am saying, which is important in 
terms of our focus on erRtions) but also . 
that I think," everyone Jlse should prefer the same. 
Of course in practice the value judgements we ITI'1'Xke are 
often based on our fears, hopes, loves and hates in 
a much more direct and less thought-out manner. Here 
once again the educator faces the task of increasing 
people's rationality. 
-' 
I have argued that our emotions bear a 
significant relation to our values. This means that if 
educators caqdetermine the emotions of children they 
are in fact involved in making a series of value judge-
ments on behalf of others. This requires justification 
unless it can be shown that 1) It is impossible to 
influence the emotions of children beyond attempts 
to encounage the rationality of beliefs involved, 
or 2) The diversity and complexity of individual children 
make it impossible to predict whether, how and where 
to their emotions can be influenced, or 3) It is 
impossible to avoid influencing children's emotions -
in which case we must ask in what direction, rather 
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than whether we should influence them. 
These are difficult empirical question$.But 
we do have some evidence to suggest that a significarit 
number of children learn to experience and display 
'appropriate' emotions, through their upbringing, and 
scb90iJ:rJg~D~~,Th,?_~·child' s environment is largely 
controlled by adults. Here many values and emotions 
are 'caught'. The enthusiasm of one teacher may instil 
a lasting love of plants,~his well-meaning, but 
patronising tone a contempt for Maori's. Children 
learn how others judge them, and react to this. The 
very organisation of a school can make a difference: 
the practice of bestowing honour and power (e.g. 
through the prefect system) upon those gooo at sport 
might lead to general disdain for things academic 
and a distrust of people pursuing these. The whole 
business of curriculum pla~ning is value ,laden. Learn-
ing a language is itself closely coupled with the 
process of acquiring values, beliefs and certain feelings 
about the world. We do not learn the meaning of 
words in isolation from the subjects they commonly, 
desciibe. When children learn that Shakespeare's play 
"Othello" is more accurately described as tragic, 
rather than humorous, or just plain sad, they learn 
something of our beliefs about the nature of human 
life and love. Misunderstanding and intrigue, often 
written about for comic value, are in this context 
too serious just to call sad. Similarly children learn 
that feelings of awe and worship apply to God, and 
pity to 'those less fortunate than ourselves'. As can 
be expected cultural differences do exist. Lack of 
material possessions may not be a source of anxiety 
in some parts of the East, but the death of an insect 
may cause dismay. The Dutch are given to feelings 
of pig-headed self-righteousness, the average 
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New Zealander seldom feels really indignant about 
anything and the Englishman is saddled with an image 
of refusing to acknowledge even the existence of 
emotions. 
In fact it is generally accepted that we not 
only can, but should shape children's emotions. We 
hear demands that schools once more sing hymns and 
salute the flag, as it is thought that the absence of 
such practices has led to love of self above God and 
Country. Bernard Williams writes: 
"What should be feared or hoped for, and so forth 
is obviously, to some extent, a matter in which disagree-
ments of value between societies and individuals come 
OUt. Equally this is a central matter of moral educa-
tion. If such education does not resolve round such 
issues af what to fear, what to be angry about, what 
- if any thing- to despise, where to draw the line 
between kindness and a stupic sentimentality - I do 
not know what it is." 1 
Likewise John Wilson claims that: 
"Morality is about what we desire for its own 
sake, and not essentially about what we ought to do in 
order to achieve what we desire." 2 
It seems reasonable to conclude that we can influence 
the emotions of children, that we in practice attempt 
to do so, and that the question of direction of such 
influence is of central educational interest. It is not 
clear whether it would be possible to avoid having ar, 
marked influence, although we could let it be a haphazard 
one. And,of course, even if it is true that we cannot 
avoid having some influence, it does not follow from' 
this that we must try to have as much influence as 
possible. These are our problems then: to what extent 
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should we aim to direct the emotions of children? Which 
emotions are the 'right' ones? What ought we to fear, 
hope for, be angry about, despise, desire, ano so on? 
Supposing that we did manage to inculcate 
some 'right' emotional dispositions, we face the further 
problem that it is no longer clear what has become of 
the distinction between indoctrination and education. 
Exactly what counts as indoctrination is a much disputed 
question in the philosophy of education. Let me 
just say that we can consider a person indoctrinated 
when, as a result of the teaching situation he was 
subjected to, he holds beliefs without due regard 
f~r the evidence. This can be applied where the ratio-
nality of emotions is at stake, faitly easily. A girl's 
amazement when he understands something quicker than 
a member of the opposite sex may indicate that she 
believes men are always more intelligent than women. 
If she can produce no evidence for this, and perhaps 
has never even considered it carefully, and if we 
have reason to attribute that belief to the teaching 
"She underwent, be it from her parents, or her school, 
then we will call her indoctrinated: her emotion is 
based on an appraisal which contain s a belief which 
she holds without due regard for the evidence. But 
suppose a person's disdain for Trade Unions is thought 
to stem back to his schooling. He and an opponent 
may agree on all matters of fact, without sdYing their 
dispute, which is centered around questions of value. 
Has he been indoctrinated? If I emerge feeling love and 
respect for my felld"men many will commend the educative 
process I underwent: but could that not be called 
indoctrination? Are we educated, or indoctrinated to 
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stand in awe of ministers and doctors? Does am 
instilled love of sport reflect education or indoc-
trination? Does an anti-litter campaign educate, or 
indoctrinate? How, in other words, can we distinguish 
between education and indoctrination in the field of 
~alues, and emotiens? 
Let us look at some possible justification 
for encouraging certain emotions in children. Peters 
writes: 
"Our interpretation of the world in inveterately 
self-referential. We find difficulty in peering out 
and seeing the world and others as they are, undistor-
ted by our own fears, hopes and wishes." 3· 
Self-understanding is not enough: this is why he 
wishes to develop: 
"Certain appraisals which lack this self-referen-
tial character, notably love, respect, the sense of 
justice and concern for truth." 4 
If by "seeing the world and others as they are" Peter s 
means we should ensure that our beliefs about the 
world and others are rational, we are, (I.hope it clear) 
in full agreement. Our nationalistic pride should 
not mislead us into thinking that MT.Cook is the highest 
mountain in the world, not should I, in my pleasure; 
thinlt my Honda 50 the fastest motorbike about. But we 
need not even have a concern for truth, let alone 
love, respect and a sense of justice, to take care 
over the rationality of our beliefs. We can find it 
rightly expedient to be rational as it allows us to 
operate more effectively in the world. I would tend 
to loose bets, or earn ridicule if my claims about 
Mt.Cook, or my Honda were too extravagant. Peters 
is mistaken if he thinks he must develop those emotions 
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in children to foster rationality. But if he means 
by "seeing" our "interpretation of the world" it 
seems that more than just beliefs are involved. When 
I judge Mt.Cook beautiful, as well as 12349 fr high, 
and my Honda 50 a worthwile form of transport, as 
well as being capable of going up to 45 miles an hour, 
I am seeing and interpreting the world - I add my 
emotions and values to my beliefs. My admiration for 
Mt.Cook, in a more direct sense, and my satisfaction 
in a less direct way, cannot be anything but self-
referential. To say I admire, or am satisfied with p 
a particular thing is to say something about my feelings 
and values. But these feelings and values at times 
cannot, and if they can, need not reflect my own interests. 
Logically I cannot admire Mt.Cook because, say, I think 
it a benefit to me by being a tourist attraction: that 
is not what we mean by 'admiration'! My satisfaction' 
with my bike may stem from it being a cheap form of 
transport (which is in my interest if I wish to 
accumulate money) but it could also be that I think it 
less given to air and noise pollution than a car: in 
which case I am considering the interests of other 
people equally (or more than) my own. Perhaps Peters 
is really saying that we would be better human beings 
if our feelings about the world did not stem from 
our vested interests in the world. This could mean 
Peters considers "Love, respect, the sense of 
justice and concern for truth" good, or right 
emotions to have. His claim that: 
"More precise knowledge about the conditions under 
which these sentiments are formed would in my view, b e 
one of the most important contributions which social 
psychology could make to educational theory."S 
depends on certain value judgements which cause him 
to choose "these sentiments". 
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Perhaps Peters is working with an ideal of 
what man should be, or how life should be lived. As 
I have already mentioned, this would indeed provide 
us with criteria for identifying certain right and 
wrong emotions. The problem (sometimes overlooked) 
is that people disagree about thev-deal man. P.F. Strawson 
writes: 
"Men make for themselves pictures of ideal forms 
of life. Such pictures are various and may be in. sharp 
opposition to each otheri and one and the same 
individual may be captivated by different and sharply 
cOnflicting pictures at different times. At one time 
it :may.:.seem to him that he should live -even that 
a man should live - in such-and-such a waYi at 
another that the only truly satisfactory form of 
life i~ something totally different, incompatible 
with the first." 6 
Some examples he gives are:"The ideas of self-
Obliterating devotion to duty, or to the service 
of othersi of personal honour and magnimanitYi of 
asceticism, contemplation, retreati of action,dominance 
and poweri .... " 7 
How, then, can we identify and justify the emotions we 
should guide children toward? Which ideal are we to 
choose? Is love the ideal? ~ove for what - for everything? 
Is it, as Wilson claims: 
" ... desirable that we should, onoBcas~on , be 
able to feel passive, humble in the presence of 
something greater than ourselves" ? 8 
What further range of emotions would qualify? 
Perhaps it is less nifficult to identify the 
counterpart of the ideal man. In other words, perhaps 
we can lead children away from wrong, or inappropriate 
emotions, without determinili~ which of a variety of 
appropriate ones they should experience. In "Intro-
duction to Moral Education" Wilson writes: 
"We have, therefore, a category of moral inade-
quacy which is very like some notions of mental ill-~ 
health;not because h~ight not be able to help what 
he is doing, but rather because he damaging neither 
dt.hter,people nor himself, and yet there i~stilJ; 
something morally - or psychologically, if the word 
be preferred - wrong with him." 9 
The first example Wilson gives is that of a boy who " 
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seduc'es girls. Even if 
" .. his behaviour damages neither himself 
nor other other people, it is not the sort of thing 
a 'morally educated' person would do: it is, perhaps 
symptomatic of a neurosis, a compulsive desire to 
conquer women, or whatever." 10 
But it does not seem at all clear that this boy need 
be displaying a neurosis or compulsive desire (terms 
which 22- suggest some mental illnessl: he could, 
very simply and reasonably, like seducing girls. 
Wilson himself points out in a footnote that the 
argument need not work for this particular example. 
!-3'ut surely he must provide us with some example 
for which it does work, if we are to understand it. 
He gives another: 
" the person whose mental illness takes the 
form of feeling compelled to touch every lamp-post, or 
to keep washing his hands, may neither be harming other 
people in any obvious way, nor yet doing something 
which damages himself. But even this person by not 
being as mentally healthy or rational as he might 
be, is in a quite obvious' sense failing _ in his 
relationship towards others. He consumes much of 
his energy in acting out his compulsions, energy that 
might be devoted toward better ends; and he may 
fail in some quite specific moral duty because his 
attention is occupied in this way." 11 
Now we would presumably hold this person morally respon-
sible because he failed in "some quite specific m0ral 
duty" , not because he was touching lamp-posts. And 
similarly his mental illness would seem to lie in the 
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degree of compulsion, rather than the subject of that 
compulsion. For what is the difference between 
consuming energy swimming, or collecting stamps for 
enjoyments' sake, and consuming energy touching' 
lamp-posts - except for the number of people who 
share your pasttime. To provide an adequate definitio~ 
of mental ill-health is no doubt difficult, but it 
woule'! at the minimum seem to require some notion of 
lack or rationality, choice, and/or control. Wilson 
(though he wishes to avoid this) seems to be making 
value judgements about the attributes his Ideal 
human should have. 
It may be true that the development, or 
avoidance of certain emotions in people will enable 
them to live a life less likely to be marred by 
various forms of mental illness which restrict the 
persons operation in the world. For example it 
could indeed be that children must at the least learn 
to love, to respect, to enjoy (and so on) at least 
~ things - even if it is only themselves. And perha~s 
in order to interact succesfully with other human 
beings, children must learn to feelacertain concern 
for others. This is the prudential argument: if you 
want to be a relatively happy, well-adjusted human 
being (and human happiness seems to be a universal 
value) then you must, as a minimum, have the 
capacity for certain emotions. But the empirical 
questions we face are highly complex. Even the 
minimum amount of love, respect and concern might not 
be an essential prerequisite for a rational , happy 
human being. An extreme nihilist could gladly spend 
his life searching for the foolproof way to eliminate 
the whole human race, as well as himself. 
Let us return to the points made by Williams 
and Wilson which I quoted previously: perhaps we 
can justify developing certain emotions in children 
on moral grounds. But are emotions in themselves 
moral or immoral? Wilson claims they are: when we 
criticize a mother who does not love her children: 
" ... we would not be critisizing her solely 
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nor perhaps even chiefly, for what she did. We should 
criticize what she felt (or did not fee~ and this 
would certainly be moral criticism in some sense of 
the word. "12 
But surely this must depend to a large degree on how 
the mother treats the children. Suppose she discovers 
that she cannot love her children, and therefor~laces 
them into a situation where they ar~truly loved, and 
happy - such as another home. She may rightly claim 
that although she cannot love the children , she 
has tried to provide for them financially and emotion-
ally. She has accepted responsibility for the children. 
Wilson, in criticizing her, appears to be arroed with 
tee ideal of motherhood, which this woman falied to live 
up to. And once again Strawson's point is important: 
there are a number of ideals. Love of children is one. 
But I hope my example has showi'll it need not be immoral 
to fall short of that ideal., 
But had the mother treated her children badly, because 
she did not love them, then we would indeed call her 
immoral. Here we have to do with what Strawson calls 
the "Minimal concept of morality". He explains 
"Now it is a condition of the existence of any form 
of social organization of any~uman community, that 
certain expectations of behaviour on the part of its 
members should be pretty regularly fulfilled: that 
some duties, one might say, should be performed, some 
Obligations acknowledged, some rules observed." 13 
Perhaps the difficulties encountered in controlling some 
forms of behaviour, justify the development of some 
very basic values and emotions in children, such as 
respect for person and property. In fact Peters' 
"love, respect, the sense of justice and concern 
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for truth" might be justifiable in terms of this minimal 
morality. There is a certain feasib1ity about this 
argu~ent, but questions of the rights of the individual, 
as op~osed to the rights of society are fraught with 
difficulty. We can grant that society must prohibit 
some forms of behaviour. It is not clear however 
whether emotions themselves are harmful, and whether 
they can be justfilaB1y channe11eo. It is a1§Bo~lear 
, even if such channelling could be justified, that 
this should be called education. 
I have argued in this chapter that significant-
ly often we cannot answer the question "What ought I 
to feel", but merely accept the way we 00 feel, and 
furthermore that our value judgements are in an impor-
tant way related to our emotions. When we add to this 
the,I think, reasonable view that educators can 
influence the emotions of their charges, we are left 
with trying to justify the extent and the direction of 
such influence. Notions of the ideal man, and the 
ideal way of life vary~ it will not do to attempt to 
shape children's emotions in terms of one of these 
willy-nilly. Perhaps concern for the individual's 
mental health , and for the necessary minimal social 
cohesion can form the basis of justification for the 
development of some emotions. But these will be 
relatively few, and relatively general. What are we 
to do about the man~ common ways in which we affect 
the emotions and values of children! the ways in which 
we organize the schools and the curriculum, the spare 
time activities we encourage children to ~artake in, 
the churches we take them to, the books we give them 
to read, the things we enthuse about and so on, and so 
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forth? Must we just accept that children will end 
up with the values and emotional dispositions which 
have been reflected by their surroundings? But, then, 
in what sense are we educating the lemotions? 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPATHY 
R.F.Dearden writes: 
"'Children must gradu~lly choose for themselves 
their conception of the good life, and hence of happi-
ness.- This much may be granted;* but now what is 
choice. 5urely it is not just an uninformed and 
impulsive plumping where such a_ serious issue is 
involved? Choice implies not only that there be real 
alternatives open to us, but that we know what they are 
and that we have a range of criteria by which to judge 
them." 1 
In the previous chapter I suggested that children may 
do much less choosing than is sometimes thought, deter-
mined as they are by their own physiological and 
psychological make-up, their home background, and what 
has been called the 'hidden curriculum' of their 
schooling. How can we ensure that real alternatives 
are open to children? What is the range of criteria 
by which the alternatives might be judged? 
In the field of morality a distinction has 
been put forward between form and content. KOhlberg, 
the main proponent of this, argues that children pass 
through set stages of moral jUdgement (the form) whic h 
we can identify without having to take into qccount 
the particular moral viewpoints the children hold (the 
content, or bag of virtues). Thus: 
" .. the only philosophically justifiable statement 
of aims of moral education, the only one which surmounts 
the problem of relativity, is a statement in terms of 
the stimulation of moral development conceived of 
as the encouragement of a capacity for principled-
moral judgement and of the disposition to act in accor-
dance\li th this capacity" 2 
*Of course this is by no means always granted. The aim 
for autonomy is a controversial one, in educational 
circles. 
Wilson uses similar reasoning in the case of the 
emOtIons. 
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"Since we can hardly suppose that it does not 
matter which outlooks, or what set of emotional 
reactions, we ge:~rate in them from birth onwards, must 
we not decide beforehand, on their behalf, which ou~ 
look and reactions are right and appropriate; The 
answer to this is both yes and no. Yes, if we, mean that 
we must generate those outlooks which, while~ also 
giving them physical and psychological security, will 
best enable the children to become 'emotionally 
educated' - that is, to think for themselves, to 
acquire the various components we have mentioned, and 
(if they wish) to change or modify those outlooks 
when they are older. We have, indeed, that criterion 
or set of criteria for generating the outlooks: 
briefly we choose those which will help children to 
develop into rational and autonomous adults: and this 
is the only criterion that would justify us as educat-
ors rather than partisan mor~lists. But the answer is 
no, if we mean that we must decide on specific out-
looks 'to generate in our children because we happen 
to think those outlooks are right by other criterion. "3 
Wilson provides us with an example~ 
"Two sets of Christian parents might both always 
take the children to church and express a certain 
emotional attitude to divorce, gambling ano swearing; 
but one set might encourage their children to discuss 
these matters, and allow the possiblity of different 
behaviours and emotions, whilst the other might discour-
age all questioning and regard al ternati ve points ,of 
view as wicked or rebellious." 4 
This is fine as far as it goes. But it does 
not go far enough. Let us look at Wilson's example. It 
is certainly important that parents encourage rational 
discussion, and do not condemn their children for 
'thinking or feeling differently from themselves. But 
it is plainly naive to think that this will produce the 
emotionally autonomous children or people that Wilson 
thinks it will. Most children who have been taken to 
church regularly will find the fact that some people 
do not believe in God little more than a piece of 
curious information y while children who have been 
brought u~ to abhor dishonesty (or love dogs, or 
whatever) will be quite genuinly surprised to find 
that not everyone feels the same way. Practice in 
discussing these questions will certainly help 
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these children ( and later adults) become more rational 
in their thinking'; but this may mean that they are just 
better at presenting their own case, while having come 
no nearer to really understanding what their opponents 
are on about. We might in true Kholberg style, argue 
for the principle of concern for other people, and 
even act accordingly, without grasping the emotional 
concept of concern. As Williams puts it: 
.' .•• is it certain that one who receives good 
treatment from another more appreciates it, thinks 
the better of the giver, if he knows it to be the 
result of the application of principle, rather 
than the product of an emotional response? 5 
We must not, he argues, 
"Dismiss too hastily the idea that some element 
of passivity, some sense in which moral impulses 
prompt us, and courses of actions are impressed upon 
us , may itself make a vital contribution to the 
notion of moral sincerity." 6 
And what of the emotions which are not in any clear 
sense rational or irrational: in what way will a 
discussion about my enthusiasm for sport, or my love 
of the New Zealand bush, or my hatred of earthquakes--
change those feelings? I know others feel differently: 
but what is that to me? 
I do not want to suggest that the process of 
influence is in any way simple, or automatic: there are 
of course plenty of God-fearing, and law-abiding parents 
who do not produce God-fearing or lawabiding children. 
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Children react against their parents, face peergroup 
and other influences, and come to see certain of their 
parent~ emotions and values as irrational. But if we 
accept that ;to a significant extent, we passively ac-
cept our emotions, and also realize that our background 
plays a significant part in the forming of those emotions 
then we must accept that to a significant degree 
parents, teachers and who-ever else, playa part in 
deciding our "conception of the good life". Is there 
any way of avoiding this? Perhaps the teacher should 
try hard to be emotionally neutral lest his enthusiasm 
for plants, or maths, be catching. Yet the ability to 
transmit enthusiasm is one of the charecteristics we 
admire most in teachers. Perhaps the teachers should 
only teach when requested: thus leaving to the pupil, 
the choice of whether to be exposed to such enthusiasm. 
But this raises problems, especially for young children: 
it is rather like asking them whether they like a certain 
item of food, before they have tried it. 
Perhaps the teacher should just aim to 
increase the child's knowledge and rationality to the 
greatest possible degree ( as Wilson suggests) and argue 
that the feelings children pick up are, to the extent 
that it is unavoidable, incidental. But consider this 
example: a class of children spend some time in a 
National Park. One day they 'do' trees and plants, 
another they 'do' rivercrossings and bushcraft, and 
a third they study the insect life in one square foot 
of earth. At night they write scientific reports about 
their findings and activities, and all the work is 
makked. At the end the children have a lot of detailed 
and systematic knowledge. But the ranger complains 
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that these children were not given an opportunity 
to get the 'feel' of the bush: that most of them 
left bored with, or hating the outdoor life. He 
claims they should have tramped and just enjoyed 
themselves: discussing various topics as the occasions 
arose: ~ven if this meant they might acquire less, 
more haphazard, knowledge. Must we dismiss the ranger's 
claim as partisan? 
I do not think so. I think we must impart 
to children not only facts about the world, but some 
understanding for the variety of feelings and values 
held by people: as well as giving them an opportunity 
to discover the range of feelings they themselves 
are capable of. If we only know that some people adore 
motorbikes, or are frightened of heights, or love God, 
without having any idea how they could thus adore, be 
frightened, or love, then we are not well equipped 
to interact with these people. This can be seen by the 
quick and utter exasperation often shown when a 
confirmed atheist and theist, or a confLrrrned pacifist 
and a soldier, attempt to have a conversation about 
G6d,'~r war. A certain level of understanding is 
a pre-requisite for rational discussion: J.G.Wilson, 
in the context of religious education, writes of 
different levels: 
"This first level is the attempt to learn about, 
and to understand or 'feel with' a wide range of . 
religious beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. That this 
level be concerned wi th~la wider range, and not be 
based on one tradition only, is, I am sure, crucial 
·to real understanding of the religious phenomena. It 
also, of course, helpS. guard 1against the danger of 
religious indoctrination .......... This first level 
teaching provides the necessary basis for, but needs 
very early on to be supplemented by, or taught with, 
the second level teaching - that is, the direct raising 
of the question of the truth or falsity of religious 
belief •.. "7 
54 
The notion of two levels can be extended to apply 
to eauCa~lOh of the emotions. Only against a background 
of empathy, can we educate people to make a rational 
assesment of the em-lotions they, or other people, 
experience. 
Let me look in some detail at what we mean 
by 'empathy!, and at some of the objections that have 
been put forward against regarding its development 
as an important educational aim. 
J.Gribble and G.OI±ver define 'empathy' in the 
following way: 
" .. when we say that person A empathizes with person 
B in regard to X, we are assertin3that 
I.Person A knows how B feels 
2.Person A 'sees' or 'understands' the reason for B 
feeling as he does. These first two will he called 
the '~nowledge condition'. 
And also that 
3.A 'feels' in the same manner as B over situation 
"B responding to X'. 
This shall be called the 'affective condition'." 8 
At the end of their article they conclude: 
"In all three fields (moral education, social 
science, history) the attempt to understand other 
people is fundamental - indeed in social science and 
history we maintained that this cognitive or "knowledge 
condi tion" is all that is necessary to sB.tis fy. We 
Conceded that there may be a necessary "affective" 
element in morals but we denied that this went beyond 
'feeling for" other people and did not involve empathy 
which nea!!Ssitates 'feeling with'''9 
Against this, I shall argue that we need 
empathy, not sympathy, in order to understand other 
people. 
Gribble and ~Liver's knowledge condition 
is ambiguous. "Person A knows how B feels" could mean: 
a} Person A knows that B feels emotion ~ or 
b) Person A knows the emotion z which B feels, in the 
sense that he knows what the feeling Z is like. 
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Similarly "That A 'sees' or 'understands' the reason 
for B feeling as he does" could mean: 
a) Person A must 'see' or 'understand' the reason for 
B feeling as he does in the sense of 'seeing' or 
'understanding' that the situation provides B with reason 
to feel as he does, or that 
b) Person A can 'see' or 'understand' the reason in the 
sense of 'seeing' or 'understanding' how one eQuId find 
reason to feel as B does in that situation. 
Gribble and Oliver seem to favour interpreta-
tions (a) 
"When we say we know how John feels, we are saying 
that we believe John feels a certain way and that it 
is true that he does." 10 
Here we are indeed not empathizing. But neither do we 
fully know how John (or any other person) is feeling. 
Suppose, for example, that a friend tells me that she 
feels exhilarated when waterskiing. If I have no 
reason to doubt her word I will then know that my friend 
feels exhilarated when she is waterskiing. I may not 
know what sort of feeling this is however. Suppose I 
ask her whether it can be compared to the feeling (which 
I can try to describe) which I have when I watch a sun-
rise. She may explain that her feeling is also intense 
but not peaceful : that it could be better compared to 
riding a motorbike in summer. If I have ridden a motor 
bike in summer, and have felt exhilarated (rather 
than, for instance, frightened) I will now have at least 
some knowledge of the sort of feeling my friend is 
talking about. I know how she feels: in terms of inter-
pretation (b) .For emotions like exh~aration there 
is no clear reason for feeling as we do: we merely 
identify how we feel and describe the feeling best we 
can. But in the case of emotions such as a man's fear 
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of growing old, a web of beliefs and values about the 
nature and importance of youth, form the underlying 
reasons for the fear. I m!ght be able to understand 
that his age and situation provide reason for his 
fear. But when I say to him "I understand why you 
feel as you do" he will assume that I understand \lhat 
it is like for him to grow old. In the interpretation 
(b) way I can 'see' his situation and feelings. 
But interpretations (b) already include 
Gribble and Oliver's third affective condition (JI A 'feels' 
in the same manner as B over the situation 'B respon-
ding to X"')The phrase "in the same manner" refers 
to the qualitative, rather than the quantitative 
similarity between the feelings A and B are experienc~ng. 
I need not feel as exhiletrated as my friend, in order 
to empathize to some extent. r(can feel too much 
emotion , which actually suggests that I am no longer 
empathizing, but reacting directly to a situation, 
rather than through feelings of another. Now whenever 
we succesfully remember or imagine h~w. something feels, 
we must feel something of what we are remembering or 
imag,i.ning. When I remember my anger or grieifJ of a past 
occasion, I refeel some of that: I might even clench 
my fists, or burst out into tears. When I imagine 
what it is like to waterski (by comparing it to my 
own past experience of riding a motorbike) I feel 
some exhilaration. 
The differences between (a~ .. arld (b) type 
knowledge and unoerstanding is often referred to in 
everyday conversation.ln the same way that I might 
know something (for instance that Christchurch is 
seriously polluted) but not realize fully what it 
means until it is in some way brought horne to me 
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(perhaps when I learn that pollution played a sig-
nificant role in my grandmother's death) , so a 
husband might know that his wife hates sta~dnq at 
home with their pre-schoolers all the time, but not 
really know how s'he feels until he has looked after 
the children himself for a fortnight. 
I wish to argue therefore that if we are to 
understand and take into consideration the feelings of 
others , than we must empathize with them. This is 
why learning to empathize is important to moral education: 
and education of the emotions. Consider the following 
example: 
Daughter: "You don't know how I feel ... " 
Father: "I do know. You feel embarrassed. Though 
,I don't know how you could seeing that 
we are doing this for your own good." 
Daughter: "You don't understand ..... " 
Father: "I understand perfectly. You are scared that 
your friends will laugh at you because 
you are being collected. But I cannot 
understand why that should matter , seeing 
that your own safety is at stake." 
The father knows and understands his daughter in the 
sense that he knows she feels embarrassed about being 
collected. But he does not ~now or understand her 
at all well in the sense that he cannot see that the 
embarrassment,and laughter of her friends matters far 
more to her than what she sees as an unlikely threat 
bn her safety. In order to consider her feelings 
properly,he needs to make the effortlto e~pathize 
with her. Note that the father does not need to sympa-
thize with his daughter. Empathy is neutral in a way 
sympathy is not. When the father empathizes he is in~ 
creasing his understanding of his daughter's emotions 
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by imagilning her situation, her appraisals and her 
feelings. His own values and emotions are not in 
question. When he sympathizes with her they are: he 
is feeling some kd:nd.o£ concern for her. There is 
no reason to think that what the father feels for his 
daughter will help him understand her emotions. Even 
if he empathizes with her, he may of course still 
decide to overrule her embarrassment, but at least 
he will have considered it. 
Gribble and Oliver argue against the use of 
novels and films to encourage tRe development of 
empathy in children. I shall examine their three ~oints 
in turn . 
.. 1. Getting children to empathize with fictional 
personages will not train a capacity to empathize with 
people in real-life situations." 11 
This is because: 
... .; ~ b? see literature or film as a training 
ground for developing empathic capacities in children 
is to ignore two related points~ (a) that 'empathy' 
with fictional personages is a metqphoric use of the 
term and"refers to a response which simulates 
empathy with real people. The prodl;\ c.. .tion of this 
response is largely e product of the artist's skill. 
(b) to attempt to encourage children to achieve empathy 
~ith people in real life which approximates to the 
simulated 'empathy' which we may experience in relation 
to fictional characters is to set our sights too high." 12 
My reply to this is simply that it is not 
clear why empathy with fictional persons can not 
help children to empathize with people in real life. 
Granted that our '-empathy is a product of the artists' 
skill: that is exactly h~w the artist can help. He 
leads us out of our own perspective, into that· of 
someone else: he teaches us how to go about imag·ining 
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ourselves into the shoes of others, be those others 
fictional or real. Furthermore I do not see teat 
we are setting our sights too high if we encourage chil-
dren to develop a similar empathy to people in real 
life. Certainly we might not be able to empathize 
with everyone in the way in which we empathize with some 
fictional characters. But there are many fictional 
characters who we cannot empathize with, because we 
know so little of their sitaation. Conversely there 
are a number of people in real life we can empathize 
vd tIl - even more fully than those in fiection . After 
all we can observe them, talk to them, and ask them 
questions about how they feel and what they think. In 
real life we can take a more active role in learning 
to empathize in a far less limited way then in fiction. 
And yet fiction too, so often, ffielps us view something 
from a different angle and gain some new understanding. 
"2. Empathy with other people is not in any 
case, necessary fmr us to treat them impartially." 13 
"Certainly the more understanding we have of the way 
people think and feel the more we will be in a position 
to treat them impartially, with due regard for their 
lnterests, needs, and desires, etc. But such understan-
ding is possible without empathy." 14 
I have already argued that full unoerstanding is notcpas-
sible without some element of empathy. It is useful 
to see what we do when attempting to decide on a course 
of action. Suppose someone is trying to decia e 
whether it is more economical to hold on to the car he 
has, or to buy a new one, whilst he can still get 
a reasonable rate of exchange for his old car. He wil~ 
examine the arguments for >;;.. End against selling his 
car, and finally attempt to weigh up the arguments. At 
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the time of looking at the arguments for selling the 
car he is necessarily being onesided: but of course this 
in no way affects his impartiality. Now in a similar 
way when we are trying to c1ecide what to do in a case 
which affects our own and other people's feelings, 
we must fully consider those feelings in turn, before 
reaching a decision. 
Suppose a mother wants to live with her 
daughter, because she hates her home for the aged, as 
predominantly old faces surround her there. The daughter 
knows that her mother hates the home, and tmc1erstands 
that the old people there provide the reason. But, being 
relatively young, and relatively happy, the daughter 
has never hated anything with such ferocity: she cannot 
imagine what sort of feeling her mother is really 
experiencing. And, herself surrounded by friends her 
own age, she does not really understanc1 that this can 
constitute a reason for hating a place. The daughter 
is not empathyzing with her mother. As she does not 
fully understand the way her mother feels she will not 
be able to take her mother's feelings into account fully. 
When she comes to weigh up the situation she has no~ 
doubt that her own love of independence far outweighs 
her mother's hatred of the home. In this example. i n 
order to be impartial, the daughter should try to 
empathize with her mother, so that she can understand 
her mother's (onesided) feelings properly. The mother 
and daughter togethe~ will most readily reach agreement 
if they can continue to explore their own feelings/as 
well as attempting to increase their understanding of 
what is involved in the feelings of the other. My argu-
ment , then is that in questions where people's feelings 
I 
are involved we must try to understand thos e feelings 
fully: thus we must try to empathize. To fail to 
do so would be like achieving impartiality on a 
question of fact, by carefully refusing to give any 
of the arguements more than a little attention. 
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. "3.Empathy with fictional personages may be morally 
mlseducat.ive as it may be morally educative." J5 
Hare is criticised because! 
"he seems to leave these unfortunates subject to 
pro~anda - to biased and inappropriate imaginative 
exerch~s For even if we allow that there be a privilic.l-
~ged few who can weed out literary distortions by "their 
own unaided observations.~ there seems to be no guaran-
tee that the rest of the motley (and, in particular 
children) won't be encouraged by novels and plays to 
put themselves in the wrong people's shoes or to Rut 
themselves wrongly in the right people's shoes."l~ 
This sounds dangerously paternalistic: 
Grib~le and Oliver know who the wrong and right people 
are, and how to get into their shoes in wrong and right 
ways - and this must be passed on to' children correctly~ 
It is not only in fiction that we are presented with 
biased accounts of situations: most people (including 
we ourselves) are prone to viewing the worlc1 in a 
somewhat onesided manner. The antidote to this is 
to introduce children to a wide range of opinions, 
values and feelings held by peoplef through whatever 
media avaliable to us. Then we c1evelop their critical 
and imaginative thinking capacities. (We have here the 
) 
two levels J.G.Wilson advocated for religious education) 
We can encourage children to think about the sorts of 
facts the novelist might have played down. We could, 
for example, ask them to write a sympathetic acco~mt 
of the viewpoint held by an unsympathetic aharacter 
in a novel. We can best protect children from propa-
ganda by making them aware of the bias, not by attemp-
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ting to protect them through censorship. 
It might now be objected that I am doing 
what I have earlier ciriticized Peters for: In the same 
way that he valued the cfievelopment of "love , 
respect, the s~nse of justice, and concern for truth", so 
I happend to value the development of empathy. However 
my justification for this is threefold. 
Firstly, as I have argued, the ability to 
empathize provides us with the fullest understanding 
of how other people.feel.If we conclude that some of 
their emotions are irrational we are much better 
equipped to un6erstand how they could come to have such 
irrational emotions, and what it is like to have these. 
In the same way we can believe certain primitive 
religious beliefs to be obviously mistaken, and yet 
be able to understand how the beliefs came to be 
held, and what it was like to hold them. 
Secondly, this model applies to ourselves. 
Though this may sound strange, we at times find it 
difficult to empathize with our own feelings, and this 
May lead to a repression of feelings in ourselves. 
Carl Rogers, amongst others, writes mf: 
"persons driven by inner forces they do not 
understand, fearful and distrustful of these deeper 
feelings, and of themselves, living by values they 
have taken over from others .... " 17 
By emp"athizing-with those emotions which we do not 
like in ourselves we have a better chance of un-derstan-
ding them, and perhaps, then, of overcoming them, and 
of becoming better adjusted and more flexible human 
beings. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, encou-
raging the development of empathy in children gives 
educators at least a partial answer to their problem 
of justifying the value jUdgements they make on behalf 
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of children. It is through empathy that we can offer 
children something of the choice of the "good life" that 
Dearden talks of. By not introducing young children 
to, say, the joys of collecting stamps, or of caring 
for animals , or whatever, we might be said to have 
limited th~rfreedom to appreciate those activities. 
But if we do our best to encourage the ability to 
empathize, and we encourage these cfuildren to explore 
what it is that people enjoy about collecting stamps p 
or caring for animals, then theYj by trying out - in 
a sense - what it feels like to be involved in this, 
or that, have a much greater chance of breaking out 
of the emotional framework of their upbringing; 
They have , as it were, a greater range of experiences 
avai1a',ble to them. This is why the ranger was right 
in his insistence that the children ought to have 
been given a chance to get something of the 'feel; 
of the bush: to discover whether they themselves liked 
it and to discover a little of what other people 
could feel about it. Again, to know that people 
belonging to motorbike gangs love their bikes, and their 
gangs , is unlikely to affect the instilled feelings 
of fear and disgust we might feel toward them. But if 
we learn to empathize with their love of bikes, the 
security of the gang, the excitement (perhaps a need 
not easily satisfied in our modern society) of gang 
acti vi ties, and ,t he hatred kindled by the way 
'nice' people treat them, then we will be likely to 
end up with a better perspective on motorbike gangs, 
and of our sociQty. (we can ,also of course , empathize 
with the fear for persons and property the gangs instill 
in the "nice" peoplel 
We are now in a position , I believe, 
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to return some answer totpe earlier questions of what 
sbould constitute a distinction between indoctrination 
and education of the emotions, which goes beyond 
consideration of the rationality of the appraisals 
involved. 
Suppose a person feels disgust for those 
involved in a homosexual relationship. He makes no 
effort to understand their feelings beyond noting~ taat." 
(unfortunately) they claim to love each other. He main-
t8Lns that all 'right-minded' people feel as he 
does. If we have reason to attribute this person's 
feelings, and h~IS unwillingness or inability to 
consider what is involved in the feelingso f otheFs 
to the teaching he was subjected tID, then we can 
judge 'him emotionally indo~rinated. Conversely 
suppose a person feels disgus~for those involved 
in a homosexual relatioflhip, but makes an effort (! 
to understand, and to some degree empathize with 
their feelings. On the basis of this he will realize 
that his own reaction is a sUbjective one, which other 
people may not share. This person is emotionally 
, 
educated. Note that his feelings of disgust 
need not change ; He ~~st recognizes the sUbjective 
nature of those feelings. In the same way I might 
feel despair at the patronizing way in which many 
men treat women, but I must recognize that many women 
are quite contented with the status quo. By thinking 
myself into their upbringing, their_beliefs, and 
their values, I can come to empathize (to some 
extent) with their feelings: but this will not 
reduce my despair. 
I can now venture a definition of indoctrination 
of the emotions. A person is indoctrinated when, as a 
result of the teaching he underwent, he has certain 
emotions which he considers 'right', without giving 
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due regard and understanding (empathy) to the way 
other people feel, and without making any effort to 
explore further his own feelings. 
What I have tried to show is that if we, 
as educators, are serious about wanting to give 
children a choice in maLters of emotion and value, 
and if we wish to develop their understanding 
of the world, including __ the feelings of people in 
it, then it is of utmost importance that we teach and 
encourage them to empathize. Just as widespread 
knowledge provides ta.e fuel for rationality in the 
field of factual beliefs, so widespread empathy provi-
des the fuel for rationality, understanding and 
self-knowledge in the field of the emotions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION OF EMOTIONS 
If we must educate people to identify, 
understand and come to terms with their own, and 
other people's emotions, then we must concern ourselves 
with the expression and coromunication of emotions. 
According to F.Schrag, a person expresses 
an emotion when: 
" •.• he acts or speaks, and the purpose of the action 
Or utterance is to communicate what the subject is 
feeling." I 
An unintentional show of emotion Schrag calls a "mani-
festation". My only quarrel with these definitions is 
that we usually communicate to ' .. _ - someone: in which ::;case 
Schra~ is overlooking those times when we express an 
emotion purely for our own benefit . Sometimes we can 
be said to be communicating with ourselves: but this 
only applies in cases such as when I am literally having 
a discussion with myself. When I (intentionally) kick 
a chair, or swear, when quite alone, I am hardly 
communicating to anyone, myself included. I am, however, 
expressing an emotion. 
Let us consider the outward signs of 
emotions which are not intended for communciation. Are l\..ere. 
rational, or irrational ways to express one's emotions 
when alone? It is irrational to e~ess one's emotion 
in such a way that the consequences of the expression 
are detd)mental to one's wants. For example, it is 
irrational for a person to e~ess his anger ab his 
motorbike, which won't start, by kicking it so that it 
is even less likely to start. Therefore it is educatio-
nal to make children aware of the consequences of the 
ways in which they express their emotions. 
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We are not always able to control the outward 
signs of our emotions. Young children often give them-
selves away when playing hide and seek. If their 
purpose is really to stay hidden they should remain 
quiet: but they may not be able to suppress their 
excitement. But even if we, on occasion, cannot help 
showing our feelings, knowledge o£ this gives us 
greater freedom in handling such situations. Suppose 
for example, that I am very frightened of earthquakes 
and that this is bound to show. Suppose also that I am 
in charge of a class of children who must remain as 
calm as possible, as panic could be dangerous. I can 
then train the children that, in the event of an 
earthquake, I will not say a word, but will immediately 
duck under my desk and keep my head down: and that 
they are to do the same. After a few practices the 
children will expect this, and the things most likely 
to show my fear during a real earthquake ( my voice 
and my face) I will not need to use. In the same way 
people tend to find it easier to lie about their 
feelings by telephone, or letter rather than face 
to face. Of course the converse is true: when it is 
important to show one's sincerity,this is best done 
in person. 
The effect._ the expression and manifestation 
of our emotions has on other people is an important 
consequence children m~st learn to consider. In other 
words they must become aware of the ways other people 
are likely to judge them. Clothes, jewellery, hairstyle, 
manners :all these things count.A girl with tattoos, 
for example, is often for that reason alone, judged tough 
and untrustworthy: which may make further communication 
with at least a number of people impossible. In fact 
just as they learn a language, so also children learn 
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the acceptability of various ways in which they express 
themselves. Social rules even apply to a natural expres-
sion of emotion, such as crying. As Schrag writes: 
"If children need not learn to cry, they must 
~nd ~o learn when to cry, how loud and how long to cry 
ln dlfferent circumstances , when to stop crying when 
to suppress tears, etc." 2 
The fact that the patterns of emotional expression vary 
considerably from culture to culture bears out the 
social content of such expression. It may be thought 
desirable that children be left uninhibited to express 
their feelings as they will: but as I.A.Snook explains 
with regard to etiquette (easily seen as a parallel) : 
"A child who is not taught rules of etiquette, then 
is being released from the imposition of custom. However 
an alternative description is that the child is being 
denied the skills necessary for his social living: hi s 
freedom is being inhibited, not fostered." 3 
However, as Snook would no doubt agree, there are ways 
and ways of teaching etiquette - and the expression 
of emotions. If the teaching is 'Boys don't cry', then 
the tacit assumption is that to be a fullyfledged boy 
one must be carefult- never to cry. However if we teach 
that 'Many people do not like (or laugh at) a boy who 
dries' we are prmtiding a reason against crying which 
the child, if not at an early age, may at least later 
question. And we do not prohibit crying when alone: this 
surely makes sense: if these are social rules, then 
the rational person should be able to treat them as such, 
and not come to hold them, as is so often the case, 
as metaphysic laws, to be obeyed under all circumstances. 
One consequence which must not be overlooked 
is the effect the expression of emotions has on the 
person himself. It may be much better for a person's 
mental and physical health in the long run that he vent 
70 
his emotional tension of what so ever sort - perhaps 
by yelling, crying, swearing, or smashing something -
rather than attempting to control all outward signs 
of his emotions, thus keeping them pent up inside 
himself. It is the educators task here to introduce 8 
children to a wide range of activities through which 
they can express themselves: sport, acting, music. 
painting, writing, and so on. These activities must 
be socially acceptable in the sense that they must not 
breach the rules of our minimal morality. Thus 
vandalism might be a useful means of emotional release 
for the person involved, but this is not sufficient 
justification for the adverse effect it has on other 
people. In fact Peters writes: 
"Much of civilized life, including pGstry, manners 
wit, and hum0ur ,consists in devising and learning 
f~rms of expression which enable us to deal with 
emotions in a way which is not personally disturbing, 
Or socially disruptive." 4 
It ~;rould be a mistake to suggest that a person who, for 
instance, paints, is in any direct way exppessing the 
emotion he is experiencing at that mOIn.ent. But painting 
is one of the many media through which we can expand 
a certain emotional energy, and perhaps express 
something of the emotional relationship we have to our 
world and ours~ives. As Schrag puts it~ 
" ... since we recognize that the world looks. 
different in nostalgia or love or despair - or , in Satre"s 
words, that emotion produces a'transformation of the 
World' - it can be said that we learn to express emotion 
by acquiring the means of portraying a transfoJlIlned 
world" 5 
Obviously different people find themselves better able 
to express themselves in some media, rather than others. 
Therefore, again Obviously, it is of utmost educational 
importance to encourage children to find the forms of 
expression in which they are most at home, and to help 
them develop the skill and accuracy in these fields 
which will allow them to express themselves to 
their fullest potential. 
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Communication with other people is one of the 
most important ways in which we exress our emotions,. 
G.Yarlott writes: 
"Whether we heed them or not, in fact, nonverbal 
signals are constantly being exchanged in the cl~ssroom, 
conveying signigicant' information about the attitudes 
and dispositions of their senders." 6 
This makes it sound a very conscious, and intentional 
form of interaction. A truer discription is probably 
that both teacher and pupils manifest their feelings 
and attitudes in many ways: and that both teacher 
and pupils can be trained :to become more sensitive 
in recognizing such 'signals" as yar~ott calls them. 
We often communicate our feelings to others in so 
many subtle ways. Just as children are sent out to 
observe the workings of farms, or factories, so they 
might be sent out to bhserve people's facial 
expressions, gestureE)j)rtovements, sounds - and so on . 
. ~ 
No doubt this will teach them much about the ways in 
which people appear to react and feel in various situations 
-and it might teach ~m something of the clues they 
themselves use to judge btherL people, or their feelings 
-thus perhaps enabling them to become more rational 
about this. It is important to remember that an assesr 
ment of someone"s feelings ~.:J based on our observations 
is essentially a guess. A more, or less likely guess, 
certainly: but still a guess. The extremely sad and 
worried looking lady' in the street might just be 
ticking off her shopping list in her head; The child 
who appears to be listening to a piece of music with 
concentration and apparent appreciation, may just be 
trying hard to impress the teacher. Observations alone 
will not allow children (or adults) to become aw~re of 
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their mistakes, of the ways in which they are 
stereotyping people - generally of the complexity of 
human fe~lings. 
Thus teaching children to communicate muse:. 
be a basic educational aim. For it is important that 
we learn to empathize, and if our observations of 
other people are liable to be mistaken, therefore com-
munication is essential. Furthermore people must learn 
I to identify their emotions in as detailed a manner as 
i possible, and it is through the expression of our 
emotions that we often learn to identify them 
accurately. And as a significant part of our emotional 
expres:£-.ion is meant to convey something to other 
people, educators have some good reasons for wantin g 
to encourage children's ability to communicate in as 
clear and detailed a manner as possible. Our most deter-
mined efforts to understand and empathize with another 
person are likely to fail if that person will not, 
or cannot explain~ to us how he sees~his situation, 
and how he feels about it; and the will-not and cannot 
may be closely related. There are people who claim 
to understand the feelings of others without needing 
any outward form of communication.However for most of 
us feelings can be misunderstood even in the closest 
relationships, and talking things out is often the 
best solution. 
We can now see that empathy ana communication 
are different sides of the same coin.: hy becoming 
aware of the range of feelings other people experience 
in various situations, and of the ways in which they 
express those feelings a child not only expands his 
scope for communication:; he also learns to unaerstand 
. --
himself better. And such increased self-knowledge 
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will make him more readily able to understand and 
empathize with other people. Particular forms of commu-
nication suit particular children : an extreme example 
is that of autistic children who can sometimes be reached 
through music. But language is the vehicle through 
which most of us communicate frequently, and in the 
most detail. Therefore our ability to use language 
has a great deal to do with how well we ourselves, 
and others, understand our emotions. 
Exposing our feelings to others is often 
a delicate and difficult process. It takes effort 
and trust on the part of both parties to get beyond 
the "IT's just that I feel;. .•. I don't know how to 
put it ... Oh, it doesn't really matter" stage. 
Peters writes: 
" .•. if people are concerned with finding out what 
is true, it must in general be the case that they are 
disposed to reveal their thoughts and feelings to 
each other." 
Therefore, he claims, 
"For any educator , honesty and sincerity must be 
cardinal virtues •.. " 
For after all 
"Often one has some strong motive for being insincere -
for instance fear or shame - and the feeling associated 
with the feigned appraisal helps to develop a tendency 
towards deceiving oneself as well as others." 7 
I have already agreed with Peters that children should 
be encouraged to be hones~with themselves - and that 
such honesty (and accuracy) in identifying one's 
own emotions is often achieved through communication. 
But though it may certainly be true that we must in 
general be disposed to reveal our feelings, this does 
not mean that we must always, in specific situations, 
be disposed to·. do so, or that there cannot be reasons 
other than fear or shame that CCln' stop us from communi-
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cating our true feelings to others. 
Firstly we may hide our emotions because they 
are based on unconscious, incomplete, or irrational 
appraisals. Thus I do not show my immediate dislike or 
distrust of someon~, lest my feelings change when 1',1 ~ 
get to know him better, or because I have not reason 
to distrust him. Secondly we may not reveal our 
feelings because of the way these would affect other 
people. Thus I may not tell a relation in hospital of 
my despair over his condition. My earlier example of 
my efforts to hide my fear of earthquakes from a class 
of children fits here. ThircUy we may avoid showing our 
feelings because this would leave us ourselves in a 
difficult , or vulnerable position. Thus I may not 
reveal my extreme liking for someone, when I judge 
the feeling to be unreciprocated, and a possible cause 
of embarrassment. 
This last category poses a special problem 
foruthe educator. Thosefeelings which mean most to us 
are often the most difficult to reveal, and leave us 
the most vulnerable. Either a certain balance has to 
exist (I will only reveal this much about myself, if 
you are prepared to open up likewise) , or a great 
deal of trust(I need confidence that you are a 
sufficiently empathetic listener who will not use this 
knowledge of me, to wield a certain power.) Both the 
balance, and the trust are often most notably missing 
in the classroom situation:which raises the question 
of the pupil's right to privacy. His relationhip with 
the teacher may not be such that the pupil can easily 
wri te em --topics such as My favourite pasttime" or 
"The most important thing in my life" - ana it is not 
uncommon for his work to be marked partially on 
'apparent sincerity' ;Some 9f the recent honesty-type 
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interaction exercises , intended o.pecifically to 
increase th~chi~'s ability to communicate and empathize 
maNe more far-reaching demands on pupils.Demands which 
may leave the pupil vulnerable, forced to trust teachers 
in whom they have little confidence. The dangers of such 
stress .On honesty and sincerity are very real, and may 
leave t:\eachers in the end judging pupils as greater 
or lesser people, rather than as people with greater 
or lesser siills. Of course much depends on the indivi-
dual teachers , and as one of the results of increased 
communication is hopefully a certain break-down in the 
rigidity of expectations, stereotyping, and role-
playing, this may apply to the traditional teacher/ 
pupil relationship too. It does seem most important, 
however, that there be a safety-valve: that the pupils 
are at_. all times giv.:.en a choice of activities which 
will allow them to express their feelings in a less 
direct and personal way. 
Our educational aims with regard the expres -
sion of emotions are, then, as follows: Firtly we ~ .. 
must make children aware of the consequences of the 
ways in which they manifest, or express their feelings: 
including the consequences in terms of the effects they 
have on other people. Secondly we must introduce chil-
dren to a wide range of media in which they can express 
thernsel ves, and help develop ·.their potential for such 
expression. Thirdly we must develop the child's ability 
to communicate his feelings to others openly and accurately: 
whilst if possible avoiding too great an invasion of 
the child's privacy. It is hoped children will ,then, 
be in a better position to dec;I;e.e when, how and to 
whamto express their emotions. 
76 
REFERENCES 
1 SCHRAG,F Learning and the Expression of Emotinn 
Studies in Philosophy and Education Vol VIII, 
2 
3 
4 
no.l, 1973 pg 31 
Ibid pg. 38 
SNOOK I.A.lndoctrination and Education London, Rout 
ledge & Kegan Paul 1972 pg.67 
PETERS R.S. Education and the Emotions IN Dearden 
R.F., Hirst ~.Ho and Peters R.S. Educa-
tion amd tge Development of Reason.LOndom 
& Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972 
pg. 482 
5 SCHRAG op.cit pg. 49 
6 YARLOTT G. 6duca tion .. "and Children"s emotions: an in troduc tion 
"Weidenseld & Nicolson 1972 pg131 
7 Peters R.S. Op. Cit. pg.479 
71 
CONCLUSION 
Let me just recap very briefly. 
I have argued that an emotion is, in part, 
a cluster concept. Appraising the feeling we are 
experiencing (in terms of strength, turbulance and 
pleasantness) is a sufficient, but not a necessary 
condition for something to be an emotion. (e.g. boredom, 
depression). In the case of certain emotions it is 
necessary (though not sufficient ) that we appraise 
our situation (indignation, pride). Physiological sen-
sations, although they may be necessary for some emotions 
(such as terror) do not constitute necessary, or 
sufficient conditions for e~otions, whilst actions, and 
overt expressions of feelings are not conceptually 
connected to the class of things called 'emotions' at 
all. 
It is important that people are rational about 
their emotions. Therefore, in our efforts to educate the 
emotions, we will be concerned to encourage detailed 
and accurate identification of emotions, which will 
allow for an examination of the rationality of any 
underlying beliefs and values. It is important that a 
serious attempt be made to be rational and responsible 
about such an examination, and that the knowledge 
and application is developed to allow people to deal 
with emotions which contradict the conscious appraisals 
they make. 
However concern for the rationa.lity of emotions 
is not sufficient. Educators can and do influence 
children's emotions and related value judgements. Some 
justification for this can be found in a concern for 
the individual's mental health, and for a necessary 
mintmal social morality. But the inluence co~monly 
goes beyond this, posing a serious problem 
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of justification for the educator, as will as a 
difficulty in distinguishing between indoctrination 
and education of the emotions. 
Rationality alone cannot be the solution 
to these problems,but the development of ewpathy in 
children provides the educator with some safeguard 
against instilling his own values and emotional 
patterns in them. Through their ability to empathize 
children will be able to increase their understanding 
of other people, and in a more real sense be able 
to discover something about their own fe~~lings, and 
about the "good life', the moral ideals and the 
general values which they might choose. It is the lack 
of ability, or willingness to recognize and empathize 
with emotions different from his own, which marks 
the emotionally indoctrinated person. 
Finally our concern to increase the children 
ability to empathize must lead to a concern for the 
expression and communication of emotions. Children.: 
must be aware of the consequences of the ways in 
which they express themselves, and they must be 
encouraged to develop their potential to express 
themselves_E!ccurateJ:ythrough whatever media best 
suits them. 
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